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In scientific inquiry it becomes a matter of duty to expose a sup-
posed law to every possible kind of verification, and to take care,
moreover, that this is done intentionally, and not left to a mere ac-
cident.1
Introduction
Scientific expert opinion is a specie of evidence that presents the
courts with a challenging set of paradoxes and dilemmas. Consider:
Scientific expert testimony is usually welcomed because it promises
to help resolve trial uncertainties with knowledge that is otherwise
unavailable to lay jurors and judges.2 Yet it is those same lay judges
who must serve as evidentiary gatekeepers,3 admitting only valid sci-
* Edward F. Howrey Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; Ph.D., Ohio State
University, M.S.L., Yale Law School. This article grew out of work done in the course of
preparing my share of DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS, &
JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997). I wish to thank: John "Max" Wilkinson and Alec Hillbo for
their excellent research assistance; colleagues David Faigman and David Kaye for their
helpful comments and criticisms of portions of this work; and Michael Risinger, who
should be regarded as a co-author of certain sections of the article. See infra notes 18-21
and 117-153, and accompanying text. Portions of this paper were presented at the Annual
Tom Krauss Memorial Bitemark Breakfast Address of the American Society of Forensic
Odontology, New York City, February 21, 1997, and at a faculty seminar at the George-
town University Law Center, November 12, 1996.
1. T. H. HUXLEY, The Method of Scientific Investigation, in SCIENCE: METHOD
AND MEANING (Samuel Rapport & Helen Wright eds., 1974).
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence have dispensed with a "beyond the ken" re-
quirement as a pre-requisite for admissibility, in favor of a "helpfulness" standard. See
FED. R. EVID. 702. But the fact that non-expert judges and jurors are not conversant
with a subject remains the principal reason expert testimony is offered. See FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
3. That judges have a duty to screen scientific evidence is implicit in any test for
admissibility, see FED. R. EVID. 104, and is made explicit in the references to "gatekeep-
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entific evidence while excluding "junk science." How can they dis-
tinguish one from the other? How can evidence, at one and the same
time, be beyond judges' knowledge and yet amenable to their intelli-
gent appraisal? The problem is not helped by the cultural divide that
places judges and lawyers among society's most improbable candi-
dates to be assigned the task of assessing claims of purported sci-
ence.4 How can judges be expected to know what questions need to
be asked and what to make of the answers? This paradox is one of
the roots of at least a century of debate over the process of receiving
proffered scientific evidence.! It has led the courts to experiment
with a variety of tests and procedures.6 So far, however, the law does
not seem to have invented a notably successful resolution to the
problem.7
At first blush, no evidence would seem better suited than scien-
tific evidence to focus courts' attention on the truth-finding function
ing" in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7. 597 (1993).
4. For a description of the cultural divisions between law and science, see ANDRE
MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 10 (4th ed.
1995) ("[A]s a group, lawyers display an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy .... ):
Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalisin Redux: Science, Law and Politics. 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1 (1993); C. P. SNow, THE TWO CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION (1959) (discussing the wide gulf between the two cultures of science and
the humanities).
5. See, e.g., Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation. 19
YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1910):
The position of an expert on the witness stand, who does not testify either to
what he has observed or knows as fact but expresses merely his opinion as to a
situation or on facts which have been established by other witnesses, is anoma-
lous in Anglo-Saxon law. It was to be expected that former generations of
judges and lawyers trained in older precedents and practices who recognized the
appearance in the courts of an expert witness as an innovation would look with
suspicion and doubt on such testimony. While the principles on which such evi-
dence is introduced have come to be well recognized and while the profession no
longer has any reservation in approving theoretically of the use of expert testi-
mony, yet, on the other hand, there is a constant complaining and mistrust on
the part of judges. juries and lawyers of the expert witness.
For an example of the view of expert testimony at the turn of the century, see, for
example, Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in the Conduct of Judicial Inquiries, 21
AM. L. REV. 571, 571-72 (1887):
Many judges have expressed their thorough dissatisfaction with the prevalent
method ... of making use of the services of experts in the conduct of judicial in-
quiries .... No judge has, in recent times, said aught in praise of the system, so
far as the writer has been able to observe. Law writers are equally condemna-
tory of the system, and severe in their reflections upon the product of that sys-
tem-the expert.
6. See infra part II.
7. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1509-16, 1583-1604 (1995) (summarizing various pro-
posed and adopted solutions to the problems posed by scientific evidence).
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of trials. Yet, at least in regard to the kinds of assertedly scientific
evidence discussed in this article, the courts seem to have treated the
expert evidence more like magic than science. In terms of judicial
methodology, they might as well have been validating Cotton
Mather's expertise for identifying witches. These courts appear to
have been looking at the totemic properties of science (that is, the
imprimatur that the institution of science could place on evidence)
rather than anything that scientists rely on in assessing scientific
claims (the data and logic and testing of empirical claims).
The present article examines the performance of the courts in
evaluating one important and ubiquitous genre of expert evidence:
forensic identification science.8 How did those courts scrutinize the
major forensic identification sciences in their precedent-setting en-
counters? Were these courts seeking primarily to enhance the truth-
seeking capacity of trials? Or something else, such as improving the
capacity of courts to quiet the jury's and the public's doubts? What
are the lessons that this past offers us for the future?
For many areas of science, revisiting the courts' historical per-
formance is virtually necessitated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,9 which requires fed-
eral judges to stop merely taking the word of experts for the general
acceptance of what they came to court to offer,10 and to begin re-
viewing the evidence underlying that evidence for its validity. Under
Daubert, no purportedly scientific statement can be valid unless it is
capable of being empirically tested; no theory can be scientific unless
it is subject to falsification. Under Daubert, past admission is not suf-
ficient to assure the continued admissibility of any purported scien-
tific evidence." Continued admissibility-or, indeed, continued ex-
clusion-depends instead on the quality of the evidence about the
evidence and the quality of judicial reasoning about that evidence.
8. Forensic identification science is defined infra Part II.A. The category includes
identification by fingerprints, handwriting, voice, footprints, DNA, fingernail clippings,
toolmarks, bitemarks, and so on.
9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. The test under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), did not specify
how a court was to find general acceptance. In practice, judges usually were content to
rely on the testimony of the proffered expert about that issue. As we shall see, even when
a high degree of controversy in the literature (not just in the courtroom) is brought to the
court's attention-which would seem by definition to refute the claim of general accep-
tance-the few witnesses supporting admission sometimes were enough to establish
"general acceptance."
11. "Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on 'novel' scientific tech-
niques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to
unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be
challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592 n.11.
Apr. 1998] MERLIN AND SOLOMON
Daubert invites so new a look at old scientific evidence, and
from such a different perspective than most earlier tests, that many
scientific evidence precedents are now vulnerable to reconsideration
and reversal. Some, of course, are more vulnerable than others. Un-
der Daubert review, forensic identification science turns out to be
among the most vulnerable.1 2 Indeed, under Daubert review, several
federal courts already have held handwriting identification expertise
to be non-science" and another has held hair identification expertise
inadmissible."
Part I of this article presents a brief discussion of the major legal
tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence. While such ground
has been trod repeatedly in discussions of law and science, here em-
phasis is given to explicating several myths that routinely accompany
discussions of these tests, and which are relevant to this article's
analysis of scientific evidence admissibility. In this fresh light, the
courts' difficulties may become more clear. Part II is a brief intellec-
tual history of the forensic identification sciences, focusing on the
puzzle of the arrested development of scientific research in these
fields. Part III summarizes the histories of the courts' pivotal en-
counters with several major forensic identification sciences over
much of the 20th century and explicates how the courts analyzed
each of them.'5 The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons
that might be learned from these encounters about the mutual impact
of the law and purported science and for judicial regulation of the
12. Some commentators are skeptical about Daubert's likely impact. See, e.g.,
Randolph Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What it Means for Forensic Science. 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2103 (1994). Other illuminating discussions of the move from Frye to
Daubert, particularly as it may affect forensic science, include: Paul C. Giannelli. Foren-
sic Science: Frye, Daubert and the Federal Rules, 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 428 (1993): Paul C
Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOzO L. REV.
1999 (1994): and "Focus" articles in 1 SHEPARD'S SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
QUARTERLY (Winter, 1994).
13. See infra notes 138-150 and accompanying text. This does not mean that these
courts did not find ways to admit the testimony of forensic document examiners
("FDEs").
14. As noted by Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995)
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11):
The state of the art of hair analysis has not reached a level of certainty to permit
such testimony. Although the hair expert may have followed procedures ac-
cepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in
this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable. This court recognizes the
long history of admissibility of such evidence, but as the Daubert Court stated,
"Hypotheses ... that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so."
15. These histories are drawn largely from my introductions to the forensic science
specialties discussed in DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS &
JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997).
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admissibility of scientific evidence.
I. - A Brief History of Legal Tests for the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence
Most modem discussions of the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence have remarkably little to say about the period before Frye v.
United States,16 as if courts before 1923 subjected expert witnesses to
no test. But the first reported decision affirming the propriety of
the use of such "skilled witnesses"' 8 was in 1782, in the case of Folkes
v. Chadd.'9 There are earlier recorded uses, however. One such early
recorded use occurred in 1699 in the notorious murder trial of
Spencer Cowper,' though the judge in that case clearly did not re-
gard it as a novelty even then.
2'
A review of cases from the decades preceding Frye reveals that
the courts, at least as far back as the civil war, were using what re-
cently has been termed the "commercial marketplace test. ' Under
the marketplace test, courts sought to determine whether the pro-
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed.
1992) (" [A] special rule for scientific evidence originated in 1923 in Frye .... "); Moens-
sens et al., supra note 4 ("The oldest of these standards has come to be known as the
'Frye' test .... ).
18. In the 18th century, the term "skilled witness" covered everyone we would today
refer to as an expert. In modem times, the term seems to have returned to referring to
practical, as contrasted with scientific, experts. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory commit-
tee's note.
19. 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 590 (K.B. 1782) (approving expert testimony by engineers to
elucidate the reason behind dam deterioration).
20. 13 Howell's State Trials 1105 (1699). Spencer Cowper was a barrister charged
with the murder of Sarah Stout, a young lady with whose family he regularly stayed when
in Hertford attending the assizes. He had been at the Stout residence until late on the
evening before her body was discovered in the Priory River. The expert testimony of
over a dozen witnesses, including many of the leading English physicians and surgeons of
the time, concerned whether a person dead by strangulation before being thrown into the
river would float or sink, as opposed to one who had drowned herself in the river to com-
mit suicide. It further concerned the likely cause of certain marks on the body, and how
much water might be expected in the lungs in a death by drowning. Testimony was also
heard on experimentation involving the drowning of dogs, though the results were incon-
clusive. Cowper was acquitted. Since he ended his career on the Common Pleas bench
nearly thirty years later, he has the distinction of being one of the few English superior
court judges ever to have stood trial for common murder.
21. See id. at 1123.
22. David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific
Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-05, 1805 n.13 (1994). The following discus-
sion of the antecedents leading to Frye, and the meaning of Frye in light of its antece-
dents, is drawn from that article.
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posed expert witness was offering relevant facts or opinions that were
beyond the ken of the fact finder, and whether the proposed witness
was "qualified" as an expert. The implicit test of expertise was
whether there was a commercial market for the witness's learning. If
a person could make a living selling the knowledge at issue, then ex-
pertise presumably existed. Although courts sometimes spoke of an
expert's "greater study respecting certain subjects,"'  or having
"made the subject upon which he gives his opinion a matter of par-
ticular study,"" it is clear that some degree of prosperity in the prac-
tice of the occupation or profession claiming that knowledge almost
always accompanied the expertise." In effect, the marketplace de-
termined whether valid knowledge existed by endowing it with com-
mercial value.
The marketplace test had serious flaws, two of which concern us
here. First, the marketplace test was incapable of distinguishing as-
trophysics from astrology. The market values both of them. Com-
mercial value, then, is not a measure of scientific validity. A second
problem was that some fields have little or no life in any commercial
marketplace. Indeed, the fields that are the focus of this Article have
little or no function outside of their possible courtroom utility. The
courtroom is their marketplace.26
In light of the test of admissibility that already existed when the
Frye case arose, we can both readily understand the necessity for in-
venting the Frye test and appreciate the real importance of this minor
corollary to the marketplace test.
In proffering an early form of polygraph testing, Frye presented
the court with an unfamiliar problem. How was the validity of such
asserted expertise to be evaluated and a judgment made as to its ad-
missibility? The technique was new. There were no professional
polygraph examiners yet, and no developed market for their services.
Perhaps the technique was valid, perhaps not. Judge Van Orsdel ap-
parently realized that the conventional legal test offered no solu-
tion. 7 The asserted expertise offered in Frye demanded of the court
a different test than the one that had long served the law.
Judge Van Orsdel found a solution that closely resembled the
existing test. The entire opinion took up only two pages of the Fed-
23. Jones v. Tucker, 41 N.H. 546, 548 (1860).
24. Id.
25. See Faigman et al., supra note 22, at 1804 & n.15.
26. Use of the term "forensic sciences" is emblematic of this fact. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 648 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "forensic" as "belonging to courts of justice").
27. Courts in similar situations have been less attentive, and sometimes dealt with
this problem by using no test. See infra Part III. Moreover, Judge Van Orsdel himself did
not bother to use the test when its implications would have been inconvenient. See infra
note 33 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
MERLIN AND SOLOMON
eral Reporter. The critical language is:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it belongs.
At bottom, this is nothing more than the familiar market test
relocated to a different marketplace. Where there is no commercial
market, the intellectual or professional marketplace could serve in-
stead. The Frye test is still a marketplace test, the real evaluation still
is conducted outside of the court and outside of the law, and it still is
incapable of distinguishing astrology from astrophysics.
But the Frye corollary did three new and important things. First,
the alternative marketplace allows knowledge to be evaluated even if
the knowledge is too new to be marketed commercially, or if there is
no hope of ever marketing it commercially. This is important to fo-
rensic identification science, which has little or no existence outside
of the investigation and prosecution of crimes.29 The traditional
commercial marketplace test, if used today, likely would exclude all
of the subfields addressed in this article 0
Second, the Frye test separated the expertise from the expert,
thereby creating explicit legal recognition of the notion that a body of
asserted knowledge has an existence separate from any individual,
and it is that body of asserted knowledge that has to be evaluated
apart from any particular individuals who might seek to bring it to
court.
Third, and no doubt inadvertently, Frye replaced buyers with
sellers as the real judges of the validity of the offerings. The com-
mercial marketplace test, even with its serious weaknesses, had the
virtue of allowing buyers to assess the value of purported expertise
and whether it was, "therefore," valid. Under the Frye variant, that
control was transferred to the people who produced the knowledge
and offered it (and themselves) to the courts.31
28. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
29. If crime laboratories, typically attached to police departments, did not employ
them, most of the experts whose work is discussed in this Article would be unemployed.
After all, what activities of life other than detective work make use of fingerprints, tool-
marks, bitemarks, and so on?
30. Ironically, it would admit polygraph experts because, despite their frequent ex-
clusion from the courtroom, they enjoy considerable employment in business settings,
government agencies, and police investigations.
31. Thus, the Frye test, far more than its commercial marketplace predecessor, is
Apr. 1998]
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If the first myth of the Frye test is that it was a revolutionary ju-
dicial invention, the second myth is that it thereafter dominated the
courts' scientific admissibility decisions.3 - In actuality, the Frye cor-
ollary was so minor a variant that it went unnoticed for decades. In-
deed, Judge Van Orsdel himself ignored it in another landmark sci-
entific evidence case he handed down on the very same day he issued
the Frye opinion.33 Frye was not cited by a single other court, federal
or state, for a decade. During the first quarter century after its publi-
34
cation, Frye was cited in only eight federal cases and five state cases.
That amounts to one case every other year in the entire country.
During its second quarter century, it was cited fifty-four times in fed-
eral cases and twenty-nine times in state cases.3" The Frye test really
was "discovered" only in the past few decades. Consequently, in the
1980's Frye was being cited as much each year as it had been in its
first fifty years added together.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975, rejected the
Frye corollary in favor of a test that focused on the scientific validity
of the proffered expert testimony. Of course, we did not learn this
about the Federal Rules until the Supreme Court's unanimous deci-
sion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow in 1993. Until that time, most of the
federal circuits37 and half the states" incorporated Frye into Rule
vulnerable to the widely varying standards of the producers of knowledge rather than the
standards of the consumers. As a result, under the Frye corollary, because the courts
must rely on the standards set within each field, they will find themselves more readily
accepting the offerings of less rigorous fields and less readily accepting the offerings of
the more rigorous fields.
32. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 14, 176 (1991) ("Thereafter, federal courts, widely copied by the states.
were bound by the Frye rule..." and "[f]rom 1923 until the mid-1970's, the Frye rule
made some attempt to hold expert witnesses to similar standards .... )
33. Laney v. United States, 54 F. 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (admitting firearms iden-
tification expert testimony).
34. See Faigman et al., supra note 22, at 1808 n.25.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Seven circuits had interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence to embody Frye:
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam):
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir.) reh'g granted, vacated en banc, and
remanded, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 480 (9th
Cir. 1988); Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council-U.S., 853 F.2d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1988); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985); United Ellis v. Int'l
Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1984); States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350 (7th
Cir. 1989). Two other circuits had held that the Frye test was incompatible with the Fed-
eral Rules: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
104 (1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
38. See Thomas Bohan & Erik Heels, The Case Against Daubert: The New Scientific
Evidence "Standard" and the Standards of the Several States, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1030,
1036 tbl.2 (1995).
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702-despite the total absence of any language in the Rules or the
Advisory Committee Notes invoking Frye or the concept of general
acceptance."
The test embodied in FED. R. EvID. 702, according to Daubert,
requires the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing40 in which it
decides whether "the reasoning or methodology underlying the tes-
timony is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts
at issue. , 4 The application of that test requires a court to determine
scientific validity with the help of several non-exclusive guidelines.
Table 1 lists the essential language of the first three of those guide-
lines in the order in which they appear in the opinion, juxtaposed
against the first three major sections of conventional scientific jour-
nal articles. The parallelism is striking. This is, of course, entirely
consistent with Daubert's goal: to direct the attention of courts
(away from concern with the popularity of a belief among scientists)
to a scientific proposition's underlying evidence and logic.
Table 1 The Daubert "Factors"
Major Daubert Factors Components of a
Scientific Journal Article
1. Testability (falsifiability): "whether [the Introduction
subect matter] can be (and has been)
tested"
2. Good methodology: "Peer review and Methods
publication..." "submission to the scrutiny
of the scientific community.. ." "increases
the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected"
3. "known or potential rate of error" Results
Perhaps the most hazardous myth of the Frye test is that it is a
more stringent, less liberal, standard than that of other tests,42 notably
Daubert.43 The two tests focus on different attributes of purported
39. "Frye's 'general acceptance' test was superseded by the Rules' adoption. The
Rules occupy the field ...." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
587 (1993). Further: "Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes 'general acceptance' as
an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indica-
tion that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a general accep-
tance standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye ..... Id. at 588.
40. Id at 592-93 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)).
41. Id.
42. See Huber, supra note 32, at 198-205 (arguing that the rigors of the Frye test are
necessary to keep "junk science" out of the courtroom).
43. The Daubert opinion itself shares the illusion that Frye is necessarily the more
conservative test:
Apr. 1998] MERLIN AND SOLOMON
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scientific knowledge. Whether a proffered scientific theory or tech-
nique passes muster is going to depend upon how it fares on the at-
tribute to which the test directs a judge's attention. Figure 1 will help
clarify this analysis and its implications.
Figure 1 Is Daubert a More Rigorous or a More Relaxed Test of
Admissibility than Frye?
DAUBERT: Scientific Foundation
FRYE: General Acceptance Strong Weak
High Both Admit Frye admits
Daubert excludes
Low Frye excludes Both Exclude
Daubert admits
Any given theory or technique can be based on a strong scien-
tific foundation or a weak one and, independently, it can enjoy "gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" or not. A
theory or technique that is based upon valid science and enjoys gen-
eral acceptance would be admitted by either test. A theory or tech-
nique that is not based upon valid science and does not enjoy general
acceptance would be excluded by either test. The interesting situa-
tions are where the two attributes are discordant for any given type
of scientific evidence. Where proffered knowledge is based on a
solid scientific foundation but has not yet gained general acceptance
within its field, Frye would exclude but Daubert would admit. This is
the situation that is usually envisioned when the two tests are com-
pared, and so Frye is seen as the more conservative test. But where
proffered knowledge has only a weak scientific foundation and yet
enjoys general acceptance within its field, the Frye test will admit but
the Daubert test would exclude. In this situation the Frye test is not
conservative at all, but downright radical. This fourth situation oc-
curs more frequently than most commentators have been aware.
Among those fields where this particular discordance exists, Daubert
Nothing in the Rules as a whole or in the text and drafting history of Rule 702.
which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any indication that "general
acceptance" is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal
thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion"
testimony.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added). This has also been the view after Daubert.
See, e.g., Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d. 524 (11th Cir. 1996) (opining that Dau-
bert intended to make it easier, not harder, to present conflicting scientific views to a
jury).
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has provoked deep concern. The forensic identification sciences are
among those concerned fields, and not without reason, as the deci-
sions in United States v. Starzecpyzel and Williamson v. Reynolds45
demonstrate. In short, Daubert subjects the forensic identification
sciences to more rigorous scrutiny than Frye had, and the field's prac-
titioners know it.
We should not leave this subject without a word about the impli-
cations for appellate review of Daubert's interpretation of the Fed-
eral Rules' admissibility provisions. It has been common for appel-
late courts to state that they review the admissibility of scientific
evidence under a deferential standard.46 At such moments, courts
appear to believe that the decision at issue is merely a determination
of adjudicative fact. On other occasions, appellate courts seem to re-
alize that a ruling on admissibility, on whether an asserted expertise
exists or not, is really a holding of law.47 Accordingly, they do not re-
frain from looking beyond the record, from doing their own research,
or from deciding de novo whether the trial court was correct in its as-
sessment of the science.' Moreover, lower courts customarily defer
to decisions of admissibility when they are made by higher courts,
treating them as if they were law.49
As a matter of logic, the latter view seems to be the more sensi-
ble. If each trial court may decide for itself whether an expertise ex-
ists, then appellate courts would have to uphold contradictory con-
clusions of different trial courts.0 By treating scientific evidence
44. 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (declaring that handwriting experts do
not pass Daubert). But see discussion of this case and its progeny, infra Part III.A.
45. 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (stating: "This court has been unsuc-
cessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison testimony
meets any of the requirements of Daubert. Not even the 'general acceptance' standard is
met.").
46. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 908 (1990) ("If there is a conflict, and the trial court's finding is supported by
credible evidence, it will not be disturbed on appeal."). The U.S. Supreme Court has re-
cently adopted this view for the federal courts. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct.
512 (1997).
47. Other questions, such as an expert's qualification, are more universally viewed as
matters of fact to be reviewed on a clear error standard.
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 443 (Mass. 1991) ("In mak-
ing the determination whether [the scientific] test is generally accepted, courts may prop-
erly consider not only the evidence in the record but also the reasoning and conclusions of
other courts and the writings of experts. In these circumstances, an appellate court makes
its own determination without regard to the conclusions of the trial or motion judge."
(citations and footnotes omitted).).
49. See, e.g., many of the cases of voiceprint admissibility cited in Appendix.
50. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 748-49 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983),
(concluding that when two district courts reach contrary conclusions on the same empiri-
cal, legislative fact issue, the responsibility passes to the court above to decide, de novo,
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admissibility decisions as holdings of law, appellate courts can bring
about more consistent treatment of such evidence as well as increase
the accuracy of decisions by increasing judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's choice to place these decisions under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104(a) (rather than 104(b)) may provide a fur-
ther suggestion that these decisions are a matter of law and not of
fact, since the decision is completely removed from the traditional
trial fact finder, the jury.
In a slightly different context, these issues have been explored in
some detail by Professors Monahan and Walker. The essential legal
analysis is this: When reviewing adjudicative (case-specific) facts, ap-
pellate courts can safely defer to the discretion of the trial court, and
employ the clearly-erroneous standard, because those facts are
unique to the case at bar and the trial court is in the best position to
scrutinize the evidence." But rulings on scientific evidence embody
findings of legislative (trans-case) facts. 2 They inherently apply to
cases beyond the case at bar. 3 And their truth or falsity has nothing
to do with the credibility of witnesses or anything else that a trial
court is in a better position to assess. It stands or falls on the body of
scientific knowledge, whose literature can be evaluated equally well,
if not better, by the appellate court. If one trial court holds that peo-
ple have unique, identifying voiceprints and that a technology exists
that can detect those differences, it is incoherent to allow the court-
room next door to hold the opposite.
H. A Brief Intellectual History of Forensic Identification
Science
This Part reviews the task of forensic identification science, the
field's origins, the evidence on which its claims rest, and possible rea-
sons for its arrested development as a science.
which is correct).
51. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as
Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877, 881 (1988).
52. See id.
53. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986) (arguing that social
science research is more analogous to a rule of law than a fact when used to formulate a
rule of law). See also Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use
of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) (analyzing a large set of cases of
"framework" uses of scientific evidence, wherein the court decides the general phenome-
non as a matter of law, and the factfinder applies the general knowledge to decide the
particularized factual question at issue).
54. For a broad overview of the intellectual history of forensic science, the interested
reader also will want to consult the works of Thorwald, infra note 74, Thornton, infra
notes 55 and 72, and other works cited infra.
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A. The Problem of Identification
Forensic identification science has selected for itself-or had
thrust upon it-a project that is unknown to other fields: the unique
identification or, more properly, individualization of various objects,
including persons, distinct from all others in the world. "Criminalis-
tics is the science of individualization."
The question posed is whether a bullet can be traced back to the
one and only one barrel through which it was fired, a signature to the
hand that wrote it, a bite mark to the mouth of the biter, cut bolts to
the instrument that cut them, and so on. Affirmative answers are of-
fered daily in courtrooms across the country as firearms examiners,
document examiners, forensic odontologists, tool mark experts, and
numerous other forensic identification scientists purport to identify
the gun, hand, mouth, tool, and so on, that left its traces at a crime
scene.56 DNA typing is merely the latest addition to the family of fo-
rensic identification sciences. Each member of this family subscribes
to the same assumptions and draws its inferences from the same basic
logic. Typically, testimony based on such identifications is offered to
place a defendant at the scene of a crime.
The capacity to make such identifications depends on the valid-
ity of a series of premises: That many kinds of biological and physi-
cal entities exist in unique, one-of-a-kind form; that they leave corre-
spondingly unique traces of themselves; and that the techniques of
observation, measurement, and inference employed by forensic sci-
ence are adequate to link these traces back to the object that pro-
duced them. The claim usually has been presented in essentially this
strong form: Individualization is "absolute specificity and absolute
identification. '' 5'
55. James W. Osterburg, The Evaluation of Physical Evidence in Criminalistics:
Subjective or Objective Process?, 60 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 97, 97 (1969); see also
John Thornton, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 20
(David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
56. Thus, forensic identification science should be distinguished from the forensic
applications of normal science. The forensic sciences can be divided into two branches:
the categorization-and-quantitation branch and the individuation branch. The first
branch looks like normal applied science: It borrows the principles of chemistry or biol-
ogy or some other established field of normal science, and with that it seeks to categorize
a substance, object, or event and, if possible, to measure its quantity. It answers such
questions as: Is there alcohol in the corpse's blood and, if so, how much? The second
branch is quite different. Its basis in an established conventional science is limited or
non-existent. There is no university or industrial department of fingerprints or toolmarks
or handwriting. The focus of this article is on this latter branch-the "science" of indi-
viduation.
57. David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Sta-
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The goal of individualization contrasts with conventional science
of virtually every kind. "Individualization is unique to forensic sci-
ence." 58  Normal science is concerned with grouping objects and
events into meaningful classes, discovering systematic relationships
among these classes, and developing and testing theoretical explana-
tions for those shared attributes and relationships. While normal sci-
ence looks only between classes, forensic identification science pur-
posefully ignores "class characteristics" and looks within classes.
While normal science is concerned with establishing regularities, fo-
rensic science is concerned with exploiting irregularities among ob-
jects within classes. Its central assumption is that objects possess
enough differences that on adequate inspection one object cannot be
mistaken for another.
B. The Theoretical and Empirical Basis of Individualization
The question arises as to the basis for believing that all things
are unique and that individualization is possible. Many forensic sci-
entists are content to assert that no two of various types of objects
can be alike, and leave it at that. For example, one textbook asserts,
without support: "It has been shown empirically, with theoretical
support, that fingerprints are unique. No two persons ... possess
identical ridge characteristics. 5 9 Thoughtful efforts to justify these
claims usually begin with notions from probability theory, but when
those scholars realize that probability theory simply cannot get there
from here, they look in vain for another route. 60
For example, after using a manifestly probabilistic thought ex-
periment to defend the proposition that no two fingerprints can be
alike, Cummins and Midlo conclude: "It is unfortunate that this ap-
proach carries the implication that a complete correspondence of two
patterns might occur, when as a matter of fact ... such duplication is
beyond the range of possibility., 6' Failing to make the case with their
tistics, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC'Y. 197, 197 (1991). With the advent of DNA typing.
ironically, forensic identification science has begun to be recognized as a probabilistic and
less than completely certain endeavor. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What
DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13
CARDOzO L. REV. 361 (1991). Similarly, the law's discussions of science once implied
the expectation science of a kind of certainty that real science could fairly be said to spe-
cialize in not offering, a view which the law, in Daubert, has begun to abandon. See Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-reaching Implications
of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 55, 64-71 (1995).
58. PETER R. DE FOREST ET AL., FORENSIC SCIENCE 7 (1983).
59. Id. at 332.
60. See Stoney, supra note 57.
61. HAROLD CUMMINS & CHARLES MIDLO, FINGER PRINTS, PALMS AND SOLES:
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best rationale, they retreat to anecdotes, assumptions ("nature never
repeats"),62 and appeals to intuition ("common sense rejects as fan-
tastic the idea" of two being alike).' A small but perhaps growing
number of forensic identification scientists accepts the unavoidable:
such identifications are in reality estimates of probability.6
Unfortunately, the probabilities employed by traditional forensic
identification science are subjective and intuitive. Only the newest of
these, DNA typing, takes the burdens of the probabilistic nature of
forensic identification science seriously.6
Many forensic scientists who concede the inherently probabilis-
tic nature of their enterprise nevertheless refrained from undertaking
data collection and the calculation of empirically based probabilities:
"In most [handwriting identification] problems it would be impossi-
ble, or at least extremely impractical, to measure mathematically the
degree of probability of accidental coincidence.... These basic con-
ditions prevent arithmetic determination of a probability factor.
66
Others, however, have been distressed by the "almost complete lack
of factual and statistical data pertaining to the problem of establish-
ing identity" 67 in their areas, and have started the belated work of
building a rigorous foundation for forensic identification science.'
AN INTRODUCTION TO DERMATOGLYPHICS 154 (1943).
62. Id at 150.
63. Id. at 153-54.
64. See THE USE OF STATISTICS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (D.A. Stoney & C.G.G. Ait-
ken eds., 1991); Alfred A. Biasotti, The Principles of Evidence Evaluation as Applied to
Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 9 J. FORENSIC SCI. 428 (1964); Alwyn Cole, The
Search for Certainty and the Uses of Probability, 25 J. FORENSIC SC. 826-33 (1980); Dan-
iel Van Gelder, An Examination of the Application of Bayes' Theorem to Trace Evidence
Evaluation-The Criminalist's Perspective, 11 J. POLICE SC. & ADMIN. 377 (1983); S.
Keiser-Nielsen, Dental Identification: Certainty v. Probability, 9 FORENSIC SCI. 87
(1977); K.W. Kemp et al., Some Statistical Aspects of Similarity and Identification, 14
FORENSIC SCI. SOC'Y J. 335 (1974); P.L. Kirk & C.R. Kingston, Evidence Evaluation and
Problems in General Criminalistics, 9 J. FORENSIC SCI. 434 (1964).
65. The problem for forensic identification sciences other than DNA is that one can-
not claim unique individualization and prove that with probability theory and data. If one
relies on probabilities, one has to admit, as did Cummins and Midlo and others, that there
is a measurable probability of coincidental matches. Then one must collect the data nec-
essary to make the calculations and base one's testimony on those calculations. All of
that is hard work. Furthermore, the rewards for that hard work are to have to temper
one's claims from unique individuality and virtual flawlessness to (merely) a low prob-
ability of error, and to have courts regard one's offerings with greater skepticism. See
Saks and Koehler, supra note 57 (predicting that the probabilistic and data-based ap-
proach of DNA typing will become the norm for all of forensic identification science).
66. ORDWAY HILTON, SCIENTIFIC EXAMINATION OF QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 9
(rev. ed. 1982).
67. Alfred A. Biasotti, A Statistical Study of Individual Characteristics of Fired Bul-
lets, 4 J. FORENSIC Sci. 34,34 (1959).
68. See P.D. Barnett & R.R. Ogle, Probabilities and Human Hair Comparison, 27 J.
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But such people are forensic science pioneers; the community itself
has yet to settle the scientific ground they long ago staked their claim
to.
No articulated theory exists that explains why unique identifi-
ability must be the order of the universe.6 The origins of the forensic
scientist's notion that no-two-are-alike can be traced to Adolph
Quetelet, the 19th Century Belgian statistician and sociologist better
remembered today as the father of descriptive social statistics.7 °
Based on a statistical concept we will examine shortly, Quetelet hy-
pothesized that nature never creates biological duplicates. Alphonse
Bertillon, a ne'er-do-well lad whose influential father obtained a po-
sition for him as a minor clerk in the Paris Prefecture of Police, had
learned of Quetelet's hypothesis from his father and grandfather, re-
spected practitioners of medicine, statistics, anthropology, and de-
mography. With his father's help, in the early 1880s Bertillon over-
came the resistance of his superiors and used Quetelet's hypothesis
to develop the first system of forensic identification, known as an-
thropometry, or bertillonage. Bertillon measured eleven different
physical features of each prisoner and assembled the measures into
special files. If Quetelet were right, Bertillon would be able to iden-
tify prisoners who had been arrested before and on re-arrest were
using aliases. At the same time, Bertillon had a source of data with
which to begin testing Quetelet's hypothesis.7
With the invention of anthropometry, forensic identification sci-
ence was born. Bertillon's system proved useful in detecting recidi-
vists. An interesting question is, what ended bertillonage? Forensic
scientists usually recount that what doomed bertillonage was the dis-
covery of several cases of different prisoners with indistinguishable
Bertillon measurements combined with the advent of a more accu-
rate system, namely, fingerprinting.72 But the historical evidence in-
dicates that bertillonage lived on, and was even introduced into new
FORENSIC Sci. 272 (1982); Biasotti, supra note 64; B.D. Gaudette & E.S. Keeping. An
Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison, 19 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 599 (1974): Stoney, supra note 57; David A. Stoney & John I. Thornton. A Critical
Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187
(1986); Van Gelder, supra note 64.
69. See James W. Osterburg, What Problems Must Criminalistics Solve?, 59 J. CRIM.
L.. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 427, 429 (1968) (contrasting forensic science's individu-
alization with other fields' practice of merely situating a sample in a class).
70. See 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 855 (15th ed. 1995).
71. See HENRY T. F. RHODES, ALPHONSE BERTILLON: FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC
DETECTION (1956).
72. See John Thornton, Criminalistics-Past, Present, Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA, 1.
14 n.53 (1975). In the instance of handwriting identification, the falsification of the fun-
damental belief that no two signatures are alike did not give the least pause to forensic
document examiners. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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law enforcement agencies well after the advent of fingerprinting, be-
ing still in use in parts of the United States as late as the 1930s. Ber-
tillonage was, after all, better established and rested on at least as
sound a scientific foundation. Moreover, the stories of the falsifica-
tion of bertillonage appear to have been fabricated by supporters of
fingerprinting.' Fingerprinting did, of course, eventually replace
anthropometry, no doubt because fingerprinting was more convenient
and efficient, and because people often left their prints, but never
their Bertillon measurements, at crime scenes.'
Bertillon nevertheless had established the concept that on some
attributes people varied to such a degree that certain measures could
be useful in identifying them. Once the courts accepted fingerprint
evidence as being uniquely identifying, fingerprints became an icon
for every other kind of identification evidence-tool marks, bullets,
bite marks, handwriting, voiceprints, shoe prints, broken glass, and so
on. That DNA typing often is referred to as "genetic fingerprinting"
and voice spectrography as "voiceprints" illustrates the lineage of
identification science. Examiners would explain that their object of
study was just like fingerprints, and courts usually believed them.'
It mattered not that Quetelet's hypothesis had not been proved.
It mattered not that the hypothesis never could be proved. (Assert-
ing that no two fingerprints are alike is analogous to claiming that all
73. See David L. Grieve, The Identification Process: Traditions in Training, 40 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 195 (1990) (debunking the story that bertillonage erroneously
identified Will West).
By contrast, consider that there is much better evidence of the falsification of this
fundamental tenet of handwriting identification, that no two people's signatures are indis-
tinguishably alike, and yet that finding has had no impact on the beliefs or practices of
document examiners. See infra notes 94 and 140 and accompanying text.
74. Though an enemy of fingerprinting, Bertillon was interested in other evolving
forensic sciences in addition to anthropometry. He testified as a handwriting expert in
the infamous Dreyfus affair, erroneously identifying Lt. Dreyfus as the author of an in-
criminating letter, leading to Dreyfus's conviction for treason. The actual author and trai-
tor later confessed. The wrongful conviction of Dreyfus was a major political embarrass-
ment to the French Third Republic. On his deathbed, for his lifetime contributions to
French and world police work, Bertillon was offered the highest medal the French gov-
ernment had to offer, if only he would publicly concede the error of his testimony in the
Dreyfus case. Bertillon refused. See JURGEN THORWALD, THE CENTURY OF THE
DETECrIVE 89-90 (1965).
75. For example, the first appellate court to admit toolmark evidence opined:
Courts are no longer skeptical that by the aid of scientific appliances the identity
of a person may be established by finger prints. There is no difference in princi-
ple in... [determining] that the same tool that made one impression is the same
instrument that made another impression. The edge on one blade differs as
greatly from the edge on another blade as the lines on one human hand differ
from the lines on another.
State v. Clark, 287 P. 18, 20 (Wa. 1930).
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swans are white. "No matter how many instances of white swans we
may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans
are white. 76) Nor did it matter that the step from natural objects"
(e.g., anthropometry and fingerprints) to manufactured ones (e.g.,
tools, guns) went beyond anything that Quetelet had proposed or
Bertillon had thought to test. What for the social statisticians of the
19th Century had been a hypothesis to be tested became for most fo-
rensic scientists and courts of the 20th Century an article of faith,
past questioning and beyond question.
C. The Multiplication Rule and Beyond
Asked for hard evidence-even today-each of the subfields of
forensic identification science rests its claims of infinite variation and
unique identifiability on nothing more than what Quetelet had of-
fered, namely the multiplication rule of probability applied to popu-
lations. The essential idea of this concept is that if objects vary on a
number of independent (i.e., uncorrelated) dimensions, the probabil-
ity of occurrence of any one combination of characteristics is found
by multiplying together the probabilities associated with each dimen-
sion. Such calculations typically produce probabilities that are van-
ishingly small. Having made this general point, the next step in the
argument-and it is offered by the progenitors of each forensic iden-
tification science subfield-is to appeal to the audience's intuition to
make the leap into concluding that no two handwritings," tool
marks, fingerprints," gun barrels," or whatever, could be alike.
Heavy reliance on the multiplication rule as the foundation of
individualization encounters numerous problems." First, of course,
76. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 27 (1959). Moreover.
failing to search with vigor for white swans-or for violations of the assumption that no
two are alike-does not protect a field's claims, it weakens them.
77. Remember, it was "nature never repeats." See CUMMINS & MIDLO, supra note
61.
78. See ALBERT S. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 219 (2d ed. 1929) (arguing
that variations in individuals' handwriting "cannot be exactly duplicated in the writing of
any other person").
79. See Luke S. May, The Identification of Knives, Tools and Instruments, A Positive
Science, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 246, 247 (1930) (stating that identifying marks left by tools
lead to "obvious" identification).
80. See V. Balthazard, No Two Finger Prints Alike, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Aug. 18,
1911, at 166.
81. See Calvin H. Goddard, Scientific Identification of Firearms and Bullets. 8 J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 254 (1926) (comparing linear striations formed on bul-
lets fired from a gun to a "fingerprint of that particular barrel").
82. See Stoney, supra note 57.
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as Cummins and Midlo' realized, probabilistic models cannot prove
absolutes, such as that no two are alike. This is not physics, where
two objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. This is
micro-taxonomy, where no law of nature prevents two or many ob-
jects from falling into the same category. Any given bridge hand has
a probability of occurrence of less than 1 in 600 billion. Yet it would
be obvious nonsense to presume that nature has arranged the uni-
verse so that once a bridge hand is dealt it will never be dealt again.
Nevertheless, in forensic science there has been a leap from notions
of probability to belief in a doctrine of unique individuality. Even if
unique individuality did rule the universe, establishing the validity of
a forensic technique would require testing the system of measure-
ment and classification as well, even (r especially) if its principal
tool is human perception and judgment.
Second, many of the rule's applications to forensic science may
violate the independence assumption, so that the probabilities are
not so small as the usual illustrations imagine them to be."
Third, with the exception of recent work involving biological
markers, such as DNA typing, the various forensic identification sci-
ences have not taken the trouble to collect data on populations of
forensically relevant objects so that the probability of erroneous
83. See CUMMINS & MIDLO, supra note 61, at 154 ("Under the circumstances it is
impossible to offer decisive proof that no two fingerprints bear identical patterns, but the
facts in hand demonstrate the soundness of the working principle that prints from two dif-
ferent fingers are never identical.").
84. For example, consider the following from Marcia Clark in State's Closing Argu-
ment at 21, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 697928 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995):
[L]adies and gentlemen, his blood on the rear gate with that match that makes
him one in 57 billion people that could have left that blood, I mean there is what,
five million [sic] people on the planet, that means you would have to go through
57 billion people to find the DNA profile that matches Mr. Simpson's. There is
[sic] only five billion people on the planet. Ladies and gentlemen, that is an
identification, okay, that proves it is his blood. Nobody else's on the planet; no
one.
85. Forensic identification examiners use the naked eye or magnification along with
their judgment to decide when two things are alike or different. See David Stoney, Fin-
gerprint Identification, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 21-2.1.2(3)(c) (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997) ("In fingerprint
comparison judgments of correspondence and the assessment of differences are wholly
subjective; there are no objective criteria for determining when a difference may be ex-
plainable or not.").
86. See FRANCIS GALTON, FINGER PRINTS (De Capo ed., 1965) (1892). Galton was
well aware of the problem of conditional probabilities: "It is hateful to blunder in calcula-
tions of adverse chances, by overlooking correlations between variables, and to falsely
assume them independent, with the result that inflated estimates are made which require
to be proportionately reduced." Id at 109.
Apr. 1998] MERLIN AND SOLOMON
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
matches87 can be calculated.' Instead, examiners implicitly assume
the odds are one-to-infinity. 9
Fourth, the steps from observation of similarity to the conclu-
sions that are offered to courts must traverse a minefield of potential
errors of probabilistic inference that few forensic scientists, and even
fewer lawyers or judges, are equipped to navigate.'
The preceding problems have led at least two state supreme
courts to hold probability-based evidence insufficient to support a
criminal conviction.' The logic of the identification evidence offered
and rejected in those cases is the same as the logic of forensic science.
Presumably, if those courts excluded other identification evidence for
these shortcomings, they would be constrained to exclude forensic
science for the same deficiencies.
Additional reasons exist for preferring forensic identification
techniques to be constructed on a foundation of real data and formal
probability models. One is that it is the main road from subjective
87. While forensic scientists prefer to use the phrase "share a common origin," see,
e.g.. DeForest et al., supra note 58, at 51, when opining that a known and a questioned
sample cannot be distinguished, I will use the term most familiar to laypersons, namely,
"match." This is not to say that it is not important to distinguish among the terms and the
definitions they denote. Different forensic scientists prefer different terms and some-
times the same term means different things to different forensic scientists. For example.
forensic dentists understand the term "match" to be a "nonspecific term indicating some
degree of concordance ... an expression of similarity without stating degree of probabil-
ity or specificity." MANUAL OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY 350 (C. Michael Bowers &
Gary L. Bell eds., 3d ed. 1995).
88. Doing so makes shortcomings more apparent, as is evident in the debate over the
adequacy of DNA typing data: sample sizes, inclusion of relevant subpopulations, etc.
See COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE 9-15 (1992). For most other forensic sciences, these issues are barely
addressed or utterly ignored.
89. See generally Saks & Koehler, supra note 54 (suggesting that the data-based and
probabilistic approach of DNA typing will become the norm for all forensic identification
sciences).
90. For illuminating discussions of these problems, see STATISTICS AND THE LAW
(Morris H. DeGroot, Stephen E. Fienberg & Joseph B. Kadane eds., 1986); MICHAEL 0.
FINKELSTEIN & B. LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS (1990); David H. Kaye, The Prob-
ability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case of Paternity Testing, 75 IOWA L. REV. 75
(1989); Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surpris-
ing Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222 (1993); William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, The
Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints, in
FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 93 (Mark A. Farley & James J. Harrington eds., 1991).
91. See generally People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1968) (holding that prosecu-
tion's offer of a formula in statistical probability constitutes prejudicial error in a criminal
case due to absence of data as foundation for the frequency estimates, lack of evidence of
independence among attributes, and incorrect interpretation of the resulting probability
calculation); State v. Sneed, 414 P.2d 858, 862 (N.M. 1966) (holding that mathematical
odds were not admissible as evidence to identify defendant, where odds were based on
estimates which had not been shown to be valid).
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impressions to science.' Another is that for several identification
techniques, the assumption of no-two-alike has already been empiri-
cally disconfirmed. As a result, the need to make more accurate es-
timations of the reduction in uncertainty afforded by these tech-
niques has become patent. Earlier we noted the possibility of men
with identical Bertillon measures. Significantly, bertillonage was rare
among the forensic identification sciences in that it allowed the pos-
sibility of encountering false matches in the course of routine work,
because only this technique kept such detailed records and filed each
card in a precise position. Under the theory, two cards could not oc-
cupy the same space.9
For every other identification technique, the only way to find
false matches would be to conduct special studies to look for them. I
know of only one such effort, by a document examiner who went
looking for signatures from different people that were indistin-
guishably alike. He found them in abundance.94 In so doing, he fa-
tally falsified the core claim of handwriting identification." Of
course, the best way to avoid finding duplicates is not to look for
them. As long as one refrains from looking for black swans one's be-
lief that all swans are white is insulated from falsification. More im-
portantly, no one really knows how diagnostic each identification
technique is. Only by carrying out appropriate studies could that be-
come known.
In addition, proficiency studies, undertaken only in the past 20
years, revealed varying rates of error.6 For example, for DNA typ-
ing, the error rate has been about 1-2%;' for tool marks as much as
92. See Keiser-Nielsen, supra note 64, at 89; Kirk & Kingston, supra note 64, at 435;
Osterburg, supra note 55, at 101.
93. Fingerprinting is the only other forensic science that keeps a record of each ob-
ject of interest. But unlike Bertillon records, fingerprint cards are filed by classification,
not by singular location. See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 503-04, 508-09. Thus,
although fingerprints have the potential to make erroneous matches manifest, only with
the advent of computerized searching may that potential be realized. All other forensic
sciences typically compare a questioned sample to a known one, an examiner decides
whether they appear to be the same or different, and these samples are set aside, perhaps
never to be looked at again.
94. See John Harris, How Much Do People Write Alike: A Study of Signatures, 48 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 647 (1958) (noting the indistinguishable similarity
of many signatures).
95. Though neither document examiners nor the courts have taken any notice.
96. See JOSEPH L. PETERSON, ELLEN L. FABRICANT & KENNETH S. FIELD, CRIME
LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM 25 (1978); Joseph L. Peter-
son & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991,
I1: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009 (1995).
97. California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors (CACLD, 1987 and 1988);
Koehler, supra note 90, at 229.
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35%;8 for handwriting identification about 36%.9 While these profi-
ciency values are open to alternative calculations and interpreta-
tions," what is most significant is that these error rates exist at all.
Even if forensic metaphysicians were right, that no two of anything
are alike, for fact finders in earthly cases, the problem is to assess the
risk of error whatever its source, be that in the basic theory or in the
error rates associated with human examiners or their apparatus.
That information can best be evaluated and supplied by placing the
testimony in a probabilistic context that combines proficiency data,
what is known about population base rates, and whatever else is rele-
vant to assessing the probativeness of the testimony. '°'
D. A Science Constructed in the Image of the Criminal Law
Forensic science plainly has something of value to offer criminal
investigators and the courts. Why, then, does so much of it cling, in-
stead, to an untenable absolutism and committed subjectivity? By
contrast, conventional science would have proceeded along a differ-
ent course, one guided by the necessity of collecting and analyzing
data to test assumptions. In court, conventional scientists might be
expected to share with the fact finder the analytic basis of their
opinions, their data, and their data-based assessments of the risk of
error. In short, conventional scientists would collect better data and
offer them to the courts without overselling them.' 2 Why doesn't fo-
rensic science proceed along that more recognizably scientific path?
98. Based on my tabulation of the 1980 through 1987 toolmark proficiency testing
reports from the Collaborative Testing Service and the Forensic Sciences Foundation.
99. See D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ig-
norance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification
"Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989). In one of the proficiency tests reported, ex-
aminers were in complete agreement with each other (100% reliability) but all were in-
correct (0% validity). See id. at 745. For further discussion of this issue, see D. Michael
Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Hand-
writing Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA. L. REV. 21, 43-44 n.104 (1996).
100. For example, how representative are the tests of the population of identification
problems encountered by examiners? Are unrealistically easy or difficult tests included?
Are higher rates of error found in blind testing than when examiners know they are being
tested? See Lamotte et al., Comparison of Laboratory Performance with Blind and Mail-
Distributed Proficiency Testing Samples, 92 PUB. HEALTH REP. 554 (1977). Are errone-
ous exclusions more common than erroneous inclusions? What do subtests reveal? For
example, in my tabulations of toolmark proficiency studies, accuracy differed between
cutting tools (38% correct) and prying tools (87% correct) and between exemplars sup-
plied by the test manufacturer (98% correct) and those prepared by the technician as part
of the test (40% correct).
101. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 57, at 369 (supporting the use of proficiency tests
to estimate the error rate reported in court testimony).
102. See Commentary, Fingerprint Trials, 339 NATURE 491 (1989).
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The answer likely is that forensic science grew up in the criminal
law. The exigencies imposed on it by police and prosecutors molded
it into its contemporary shape. 3 A particularly dramatic demonstra-
tion of this is the lengths to which some forensic scientists have been
willing to go to provide courts with the testimony prosecutors wanted
courts to hear, regardless of the truth. Paul Giannelli has summa-
rized an array of fraudulent science, faked tests, and perjured testi-
mony.Y4 But one need not look to such scandalous examples to find
the influence of the adversary process at work. Consider the follow-
ing demands under which forensic science has been required to oper-
ate.
In order to win a conviction, the prosecution must prove its case
"beyond a reasonable doubt." If the forensic scientist testifies: "I
cannot tell these questioned and known evidence items apart, so they
probably share a common origin, but of course this is only a subjec-
tive estimation based on intuition, because we've never mapped the
distribution of what is out there" or "based on our sampling of the
population we calculate the probability of a coincidental match to be
at the following level of probability," room is left for some doubt.
But doubt vanishes if the forensic scientist can say something along
these lines: "Because the questioned and the known look alike, and
because each person's or object's marks are unique in all the world, I
can state with certainty my opinion that the defendant left the mark-
ers found at the crime scene."
Gaps will be seized upon by the defense, which will argue to the
jury: "If there is even one other match out there, that makes two
people who might have done it, only one of whom is my client; that
implies a 50:50 chance that someone other than my client is guilty.
Surely you cannot regard that as guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Courts have reversed convictions on the reasoning that a merely rare
103. Had the reverse been true, had forensic science come into being in the service of
the defense, it no doubt would be distorted in the opposite direction, with an exaggerated
emphasis on exclusion. Rather than quieting doubts, it would be the master of raising
them. Both are perfectly sensible inferences that can be drawn. The emphasis comes not
from the science, but from its use by lawyers.
104. See Paul Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997) (proposing that forensic scientists be freed from the pres-
sures that lead to fraud and perjury by removing crime laboratories from the control of
police departments). To this extent, then, we are making the same point: That in impor-
tant respects forensic science is a product of the social arrangements within which it is
required to operate and evolve. See generally David Johnston & Andrew C. Revkin, Re-
port Finds F.B.L Lab Slipping From Pinnacle of Crime Fighting, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29,
1997, at Al, B8. ("Scientists at the laboratory said they were often stifled in an operation
run by nontechnical field agents who had little knowledge of science and who regularly
altered reports to help prosecutors.").
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probability is not sufficient to prove guilt.' From a litigator's view-
point, there is a world of difference between saying this is a match
and saying this is the match. What modern scientists do as a matter
of course-measure the risk of error-presents serious problems for
prosecutors and therefore for forensic scientists."°
Because of its institutional position within the legal system, the
forensic identification sciences have taken on a shape that resembles
no other science. Consider these special attributes: No other fields
are as closely affiliated with a single side of litigation as forensic sci-
ence is to criminal prosecution.'" Police crime laboratories were not
begun in order to provide science for police and courts, but as a pub-
lic relations device." Even today, few of the personnel of crime
laboratories have scientific training beyond the undergraduate level,
and some not even that." Crime laboratories generate very little re-
search, which to a scientist means they are not doing science, and to a
lawyer should say at least that little progress is being made. At best,
they apply science, but even that often is not the case." ° Progress
might come from their colleagues in industrial or academic depart-
ments. But there are no industrial uses of what forensic identifica-
tion scientists do. And the number of university programs to train
105. See, e.g., State v. Sneed, 414 P.2d 858, 861-62 (N.M. 1966).
106. The continued pressure created by this legal goalpost may be illustrated by an
advertisement by Genetic Design, a DNA typing laboratory: "When there's no room for
doubt. Let Genetic Design Perform Your Forensic DNA Analysis and Put an End to Un-
certainty." Program of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, 45th Annual Meet-
ing, February 15-20, 1993, Boston, MA, outside rear cover. This is particularly ironic,
given that DNA typing is the prototypical forensic identification science that has revealed
to courts the need for sampling and probability calculations in forensic identification. See
Saks & Koehler, supra note 57.
107. Most of the fields we are talking about in this article have no function except as
part of the government's investigation and prosecution of crime. Forensic science use of
biological markers provides the exception that tests this rule. Unlike toolmarks,
bitemarks. handwriting, and so on, which essentially were developed within and for police
work, techniques using biological markers were borrowed from disciplines that had a
separate and established existence. The approach used by those latter techniques, even in
their forensic applications, bears a strong resemblance to their root science, with a con-
cern for empirical data, quantification, and the measurement of error.
108. See Thornton, supra note 72, at 7.
109. This is not a matter of academic snobbery. It is in Ph.D. programs where stu-
dents are trained to "think like a scientist." An analogy might be law firms hiring parale-
gals to work as attorneys, rather than law school graduates. They can follow a variety of
recipes, but as a group their understanding penetrates only so far. In other fields, such as
radar or sonar or in hospital laboratories, we call such people technicians. That crime
laboratory technicians have come to be called forensic scientists is, very likely, a product
of the needs of lawyers.
110. Where is the "application" from basic science to forensic identification science?
What are the basic sciences from which come fingerprint identification, handwriting iden-
tification, and the others? There are none.
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forensic scientists can be counted on one's fingers."' The maldis-
tribution of forensic scientists so favors the prosecution that the de-
fense has little access to any, which prevents the adversary process
from working, as intended, to expose error."2 The institutional set-
ting of forensic science promotes habits of thought that more closely
resemble the thinking of litigators than of scientists. While science
pursues knowledge through disconfirmation," prosecutions are won
by confirmatory proofs. This confirmatory bias dominates the
thinking of most forensic scientists." Where science advances by
open discussion and debate, forensic science has been infected by the
litigator's preference for secrecy. 5 Tests of the proficiency of crime
111. Indeed, for the working forensic scientist, there is an implicit disincentive to ask
fundamental questions and make fundamental advances. Fundamental new discoveries
risk raising judicial doubts about all that had gone before, and what future research might
reveal about past conclusions. No advances means fewer doubts.
The problem is illustrated by an exchange between a judge at a continuing judicial
education program and a physician who spoke to the group. The physician showed slides
of certain marks on a child's vagina, and explained that those once were thought to indi-
cate sexual abuse of the child, but that subsequent research had shown that they were not.
With apparent distress, a judge asked the physician whether she recalled appearing in his
court some years before and testifying that such marks did support abuse charges, and
resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant. The judge was upset, be-
cause the physician's lecture was tantamount to recanting her earlier testimony, and im-
plied that an innocent man may have gone to prison. The physician asked the judge if he
would prefer that the medical profession stop advancing its knowledge so that they and he
would never have to learn about their past mistakes. This incident took place at the Uni-
versity of Iowa College of Law, involving Iowa judges and a physician from the Univer-
sity of Iowa Hospital. It was related to me by my colleague, Professor Sheldon Kurtz,
who was present for the doctor's presentation and the informal exchange following it.
112. Almost uniquely, forensic science finds itself without any regular source of com-
petition to challenge it, to compel it to strengthen and improve its knowledge base, to per-
form in a first rate fashion. As a result, little progress is made and avoidable errors go
unchecked.
113. See Karl Popper, CONJECrURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability"), quoted in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,593 (1993) (emphasis deleted).
114. Conventional scientists are said to proceed by falsification, or disconfirmation.
That is, they subject hypotheses to tests capable of disproving their validity. See id.
Crime investigators, including forensic scientists, pursue investigatory strategies that
more closely resemble the confirmatory strategies of people in ordinary life. See W.B.
Swann, Jr. & T. Giuliano, Confirmatory Search Strategies in Social Interaction: How,
When, Why, and with What Consequences?, 5 J. SOC. & CLIN. PSYCH. 511 (1987). That is,
they try to obtain evidence consistent with the hypothesis of interest. For crime investiga-
tors, that means seeking evidence consistent with a suspect's guilt. See, e.g., the descrip-
tion of fingerprint identification given in PAUL L. KIRK, CRIME INVESTIGATION:
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND THE POLICE LABORATORY 71 (2nd ed. 1974).
115. Although in individual cases the release of information is regulated by law, see
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, general knowledge also is kept under wraps. The director of one
laboratory attended a defense lawyer's continuing education seminar "undercover" and
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laboratories are conducted anonymously, kept secret, and are not
routinely published."6 It is ironic that while studies of the effective-
ness and accuracy of so many professional enterprises are available in
published literature, the same is not true of a field whose sole pur-
pose is to do some of the public's most public business.
In short, courts and lawyers and the criminal justice establish-
ment within which the forensic identification sciences exist are in all
probability the major cause of the arrested development of forensic
identification science. The norms of science and of scientific institu-
tions have been too faint and distant an influence on forensic science.
111. A Series of Encounters
This Part examines the law's leading encounters with several ma-
jor forensic identifications sciences, encounters which not only set the
precedents for the courts' reception of each particular forensic science
subfield, but set the patterns for dealing with claims of science in other
forensic fields. Lessons emerge from each of these experiences.
A. Handwriting Identification: Heads, the Proponent Wins; Tails, the
Opponent Loses
Because the ancient and recent history of asserted handwriting
identification expertise, and the law's response to it, have been dis-
cussed at length elsewhere,"7 this section will provide only a brief
summary of that long history.
Handwriting identification expertise is the oldest "forensic sci-
ence," in the sense of a skill whose only value is in resolving legal dis-
putes. Modern handwriting identification experts claim, in parallel
with other forensic identification experts, that writing varies infinitely
among people, therefore that no two people write alike,"8 and that they
later "'noted with alarm" that D.E.A. and F.B.I. manuals were being offered for sale to
defense attorneys. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 27-28 n.9. Another example is
the fact that proficiency testing results are not published and access to that data is limited.
Compare this with the norms of science. See SHARING RESEARCH DATA (S. Fienberg,
M. Martin & M. Straf eds., 1985).
116. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 96, at 7 (noting crime laboratories' refusal to
participate in proficiency testing unless anonymity and confidentiality were assured): see
also Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of
Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993) (discussing proficiency testing, human
error, fraudulent evidence, reliability, and similar issues).
117. See Risinger et al., supra note 99, at 751-71. See generally Risinger & Saks, supra
note 99. Moreover, I want to credit Professor Risinger as a co-author of this subsection of
the present article on handwriting identification.
118. Complicating handwriting identification is the additional problem of variation
within a writer's work as well as among writers. This factor reduces the likely validity of the
claim and increases the risk of error in any given case. Also, see Harris's data tending to
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have a special ability to determine the authorship of a piece of writing,
including detecting forgeries.
The notion that handwriting can be used to identify an author is
very old. 9 The notion that a person can learn to make such an identi-
fication by study has also been around for a long time. Attempts to
develop a system of such expertise appear to have started in Italy and
France in the seventeenth century,120 and by 1737 were well enough ac-
cepted in France to have been incorporated into the law."' A century
after its introduction in French courts, handwriting expertise entered
Anglo-American courts, although the courts welcomed it hesitantly,
sometimes admitting," but more often excluding" 3 or placing limita-
tions on what the expert could do.' Not until an 1854 statute was
construed to authorize it, did handwriting identification expertise be-
come admissible in English courts!
In the United States, until passage of the English statute, most
American jurisdictions followed English practice and rejected such ex-
pertise, though there were some important exceptions. In 1836, with
Moody v. Rowell,'2' Massachusetts became the first common law juris-
diction to authorize the use of a handwriting expert, reasoning that be-
cause the conventional non-expert methods of identifying disputed
writings were so poor, the expert was unlikely to be any worse.'2While by 1900 a substantial majority of American jurisdictions ac-
contradict the claim, supra note 94, at 647.
119. "Just as all men do not have the same speech sounds, neither do they have the same
handwriting," attributed to Aristotle in HuNTINGDON HARTFoRD, You ARE WHAT YOU
WRrrE 43 (1973).
120. The earliest treatise in this line, of a definite graphological cast, appears to be
Camillo Baldi, Trattato come da una lettera missiva si conoscano la natura, e qualitd dello
scrittore (Milano, Geo. Batt Bidelli, 1625) [An Essay on the Means of Examining the Char-
acter and Qualities of a Writer from His Letters].
121. See Risinger & Saks, supra note 99, at 22 n.8.
122. See, e.g., Goodtitle d. Revett v. Braham, 4 Term Rep. 497,498,100 Engl. Rep. 1139,
1140 (1792).
123. See, e.g., Carey v. Pitt, 170 Eng. Rep. 219 (1793) (holding that hand-writing cannot
be proved by a person who has never corresponded with him or seen him write); Stranger v.
Searle, 170 Eng. Rep. 265 (1793) (holding that evidence of hand-writing from comparison of
hands not admissible).
124. See The King v. Cator, 170 Eng. Rep. 661, 670-71 (C.P. 1802); Doe d. Mudd v.
Suckermore, 111 Eng. Rep. 1331,1333,1344,1347 (K.B. 1836).
125. See Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 340-42 (4th ed.
1993).
126. See Risinger et al., supra note 99, at 757-58 n.116.
127. 34 Mass (17 Pick.) 490,498 (1836).
128. The Moody court concluded that "this species of evidence, though generally very
slight, and often wholly immaterial, is competent evidence." Id at 498. This seems to be the
dominant rationale for the allowance of such testimony in those states which followed Mas-
sachusetts' lead over the next fifty to seventy-five years. See Risinger et al., supra note 99, at
736-37, nn.21-22 and accompanying text.
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cepted such testimony,'29 the prevailing attitude may be best exempli-
fied by the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Hoag v.
Wright,'30 where the court said:
The opinions of experts upon handwriting, who testify from com-
parison only, are regarded by the courts as of uncertain value, be-
cause in so many cases where such evidence is received witnesses of
equal honesty, intelligence and experience reach conclusions not
only diametrically opposite, but always in favor of the party who
called them. 3'
As much or more than most forensic sciences, handwriting exper-
tise was a product of the needs of litigators. When lawyers wanted ex-
perts to identify handwriting, and when the courts finally admitted such
expertise, there were no handwriting experts. Lawyers seeking to util-
ize such testimony had to proffer various witnesses who were willing to
assert a kind of ad hoc expertise acquired as a side effect of being
something else, such as a postal inspector or a bank teller. No practic-
ing forensic document examiner today would concede any expertise to
such witnesses.'3 2 When the legal system agreed to accept such testi-
mony, however, it created a demand which was to be met by people
who turned their entire attention to filling it.
Two events finally gained respectability for handwriting expertise.
One was the publication in 1910 of Albert S. Osborn's Questioned
Documents, with an introduction by John Henry Wigmore.'33 Osborn's
book, Osborn's personality, and Osborn's friendship with Wigmore,
are the cornerstones upon which respect for asserted handwriting iden-
tification expertise in the United States was built. Osborn's book set
out the theory and practice of the claimed expertise so comprehen-
sively that it is fair to say that all treatments of the subject since have
simply been rearrangements or expansions of Osborn's 1910 book.'
Together, Osborn and Wigmore conducted a quarter century public
relations campaign on behalf of "scientific" handwriting identification
expertise as practiced by Osborn and described in his book.
The "arrival" of document examination was finally secured by the
Lindbergh Baby kidnapping case, State v. Hauptmann, '> in 1935. Os-
129. The earliest authority for the admission of such testimony in each United States
jurisdiction is set out chronologically in Risinger et al., supra note 99, at 788-92, app.3.
130. 66 N.E. 579 (1903).
131. Id. at 581; accord Miles v. Loomis, 75 N.Y. 88 (1878); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 30 N.J. Eq. 193 (1878); In re Fuller's Estate, 70 A. 105 (1908).
132. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 78, at 286-88.
133. ALBERTS. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (1910).
134. This includes Osborn's own 1929 second edition, supra note 78, which had surpris-
ingly little new information on handwriting identification theory or practice. Most of its ma-
terial on those topics is taken verbatim from the 1910 edition, supra note 133.
135. 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).
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born was the chief witness called to testify that Bruno Richard
Hauptmann had written all of the ransom notes found or sent after the
abduction of the son of Charles A. Lindbergh* 6 The public seemed to
need to believe Hauptmann was guilty, wanted him convicted, and was
grateful to those who supplied the evidence. Osborn became a celeb-
rity. For 60 years following the affirmance of State v. Hauptmann, no
reported opinion rejected handwriting expertise, nor was much skepti-
cism displayed towards it. Rather, it became universally accepted as
scientific and dependable."'
After standing unquestioned for most of this century, a re-
evaluation of handwriting identification expertise has resulted from the
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert. To date, three federal decisions
have undertaken this new look, and each has concluded that forensic
document examination lacks a scientific basis.
In United States v. Starzecpyzel,39 Judge McKenna examines at
length the claims of handwriting identification expertise to scientific
status, and rejects them.'4 Because asserted handwriting identification
136. See id. at 822.
137. This may be best illustrated by the following quotation from In re Estate of Sylvestri,
a New York decision contrasting sharply with the criticism found in Hoag. "Since that rather
cynical observation was made by our highest court in Hoag, examiners of questioned docu-
ments, as handwriting experts prefer to be called, have attained more respectable standing in
the courtroom." 55 A.D. 2d 916,390 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 1977). As a New Jersey court
observed in Morrone v. Morrone, 130 A.2d 396 (NJ. 1957), after the Hauptmann case,
handwriting identification expertise could no longer be regarded as "the lowest order of evi-
dence and... accorded little evidential weight." Id at 400. Osborn recognized the central-
ity of the Hauptmann case. Concerning it, he wrote in 1940, "[i]t can be correctly stated that
in that little one hundred year old courtroom at Flemington, NJ., the scientific examination
and proof of the facts in document cases was nationally recognized and firmly established as
a New Profession." Albert S. Osborn, A New Profession, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 303 (1940),
reprinted in Osborn, supra note 78, at 311. For a similar evaluation, see JAMES V.P.
CONWAY, EVIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 210 (1959).
138. See United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850 (3rd Cir. 1995) (likening hand-
writing identification to other non-sciences, but claiming nonetheless to apply the Daubert
test "in an exercise of caution"); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that forensic document examination expertise is outside the scope
of Daubert but may be admissible as nonscientific "skilled" testimony); United States v.
Ruth, 42 MJ. 730,732 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (essentially adopting Judge McKenna's
opinion in Starzecpyzel as its own).
139. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The author, called as a witness by the opponent
of admissibility, testified at the Daubert hearing concerning the methodological and statisti-
cal requirements of empirical verification generally, and the lack of such studies or other
data testing the claims of handwriting identification expertise.
140. The defense presented evidence demonstrating that: After a century of existence,
the field of forensic handwriting identification had produced little or no research demon-
strating the truth of any of its major claims, such as about the nature of handwriting or
document examiners' special skills, that some research showed the claim of unique variation
in handwriting to be false by finding numerous signature doubles (supra note 94), and that
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expertise is not scientific, however, he reasons that it need not pass
Daubert's validation requirements, because those apply only to sci-
ences. He then analogizes handwriting examiners to harbor pilots, who
learn to do something dependably by experience.'"' And he shifts the
burden of proof on the issue of whether a non-science expertise exists
from the proponent to the opponent.'42 Nevertheless, Judge McKenna
then declared himself persuaded that the inferences as to genuineness
of the signature at issue in the case before him "can be performed with
sufficient reliability to merit admission.',
4
United States v. Velasquez14 is somewhat more problematic than
Starzecpyzel because it is more ambiguous. The Velasquez court never
clearly explained whether it was judging the admissibility of handwrit-
ing identification expertise under the Daubert criteria for scientific evi-
dence, or under some other standard for "technical or other specialized
knowledge. , 14s It cites Starzecpyzel as authority for the proposition
that the criteria for judging admission of "scientific expertise set out in
Daubert are inapplicable to non-scientific handwriting identifica-
proficiency studies of handwriting examiners showed high error rates. The court concluded:
"Were the Court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE [forensic document examiners] tes-
timony, it would have to be excluded. This conclusion derives from a straightforward analy-
sis of the suggested Daubert factors-testability and known error rate, peer review and pub-
lication, and general acceptance-in light of the evidence adduced at the Daubert hearing."
Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1036. "In sum, the testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly es-
tablished that forensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification pro-
gram, professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be re-
garded as 'scientific ... knowledge."'). Id. at 1038.
141. The difference is that harbor pilots learn from the instant feedback they receive if
they ground a ship or deliver it to the wrong wharf. But forensic identification, including
handwriting, is an altogether different task. Neither handwriting examiners themselves, nor
lay judges or jurors, can tell whether the identification is correct or not. Whereas the crite-
rion of success or failure in the world of harbor pilots is immediately obvious to all, the accu-
racy of the conclusions of document examiners remains opaque to all, including them.
142. According to Judge McKenna, the defense "presented no evidence, beyond the
bald assertions [of its experts], that FDEs [forensic document examiners] cannot reliably
perform this task. Defendants have simply challenged the FDE community to prove that
this task can be done reliably. Such a demonstration of proof, which may be appropriate for
a scientific expert witness, has never been imposed on 'skilled' experts." Starzecpyzel 880 F.
Supp. at 1046. The implication that the ultimate risk of non-persuasion as to reliability is
ever on the opponent of a proffer of evidence is remarkable, both as a general notion of evi-
dence law and more specifically in the context of Daubert. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a), the proponent of expert evidence must show by a preponderance that the evidence is
admissibile. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 593 n.10 (1993) (citing Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)).
143. Starzecpzel. 880 F. Supp. at 1046. Judge McKenna went on to fashion a jury in-
struction to be given in advance of the expert's testimony to explain that the testimony was
not the result of a scientific process, so that the jurors would have no misconceptions in that
regard. See id. app. at 1050-51.
144. 64 F.3d 844 (3rd Cir. 1995).
145. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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tion.' '146 The Velasquez court then goes on to say, however, that "[i]n
an exercise of caution" it will review the proffered expertise "for quali-
fications of reliability and fit as those factors have been explicated in
Daubert,"47 -as though the proffered document examination expertise
might be a science. But the court then proceeds never even to mention
the validity criteria for scientific evidence actually set out in Daubert.
It concludes by saying, "we agree with the district court that Ms. Bon-
jour's proposed testimony concerned 'scientific, technical or other spe-
cialized testimony' and was sufficiently reliable to be admissible." '
This conclusion touches all possible bases for admitting expert evi-
dence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and commits to none. At
best it is an implied Starzecpyzel analysis, and not by any means a
Daubert scientific validity analysis.
One exception to this pattern has emerged. In the trial of Timo-
thy McVeigh in the Oklahoma Bombing case,149 the court prohibited
document examiners from testifying to any identification of the author
of a writing unless the proponent could convince the court at a Daubert
hearing that their claims rested on a scientific foundation.15 The gov-
ernment declined to attempt to do so and no expert document examin-
ers testified at the trial.
This oldest of forensic sciences, originally admitted because it was
"unlikely to be any worse" than lay testimony, now provides us with
the first major preview of how courts under Daubert may come to
analyze not only asserted handwriting identification expertise, but any
of the major forensic identification sciences which, upon examination,
are found to contain little science. The problem with the Starzecpyzel
analysis is that once the court deprives an area of the label "science,"
the validation standards for admissibility may plummet almost to zero.
Anomalously, the burden shifts to the opponent to prove affirmatively
that the experts cannot do what they claim they can do.
The treatment of handwriting examiners highlights the inadequacy
of Daubert in addressing only the "scientific" prong of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. Under Starzecpyzel, once a proffered scientific exper-
tise fails, it simply is evaluated for admission as a non-scientific exper-
tise. What test exists to guide courts in assessing the validity of non-
scientific expertise, the "technical or other specialized knowledge,"
prongs of Federal Rule of Evidence 702? At present, none. Star-
146. Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 850.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 851.
149. See United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Feb. 5,
1997) (ruling on pre-trial motion).
150. Judge Matsch's ruling still would have allowed general, non-identifying testimony
from asserted handwriting experts.
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zecpyzel teaches us how large a hole that can leave, one so large that it
is capable of swallowing Daubert in one gulp. In McVeigh Judge
Matsch found another way to admit a document examiner's testimony
while recognizing that the field on which the testimony is based fails
the Daubert test.
In dealing with non-scientific expertise under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, several considerations should be noted. One is that va-
lidity can remain the touchstone. If there are no data confirming the
validity of a field's claims, then it is not difficult to insist on empirical
data demonstrating the special skills of the particular witness.' Sci-
ence, real science, simply makes it easier to evaluate the knowledge
claims, because real science produces data as a matter of its very nature
which can be offered for the court's evaluation.'52 Dealing with non-
science will not be so easy. As Professor Imwinkelried has observed in
urging courts to develop rational validity standards for non-scientific
evidence, "the epistemology of nonscientific expert knowledge is quite
different from that of scientific propositions.... [T]he development of
objective validation standards for nonscientific opinion is likely to
prove to be a more difficult task than the formulation of such tests for
scientific testimony."' 53 While Judge McKenna's approach might be
justifiable for a harbor pilot's testimony, in a purely forensic area, such
as handwriting identification, some higher standard of affirmative
proof would seem to be needed to insure that the conclusions proffered
can be arrived at dependably.
B. Fingerprints: Vouched for by Dr. Twain and God
That expert testimony based upon fingerprint evidence to prove
identity is admitted in every jurisdiction of the United States' is
widely known. Less well known is the advent of judicial acceptance of
the technique during the second decade of the Twentieth Century.
This evidentiary development is characterized by meager judicial scru-
tiny combined with rapid spread of acceptance among numerous juris-
151. For example, suppose a witness claims special ability as a tea taster. It would be
relatively easy to construct tests of that asserted skill. Samples of teas of various kinds could
be prepared in double-blind fashion and presented to the purported expert who would try to
identify and rate the various teas. The responses would be compared to the known tea types.
age, chemical composition, or whatever is relevant, and the results of how well the proffered
witness performed could be reported to the court for its evaluation.
152. Indeed, the absence of data is the first hint that something is not science.
153. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony. 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2294 (1994).
154. See Annotation, Fingerprints, Palmprints, or Bare Footprints as Evidence, 28 A.L.R.
1115 (1953).
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dictions. Such speed is especially surprising considering that finger-
print identification presented the courts with a novel claim (infinite in-
dividuality) in an astonishingly strong form (infallibility),"5 and consid-
ering the recent failings of anthropometry, the defective first child of
forensic individuation, which had made very similar claims.156
Case law upholding the admission of fingerprint evidence begins
in Illinois in 1911 with People v. Jennings.1 Within the decade New
Jersey,"' New York,"5 9 Nevada,'O and Texas... joined Illinois in ap-
proving the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. These initial jurisdic-
tions established the rationale for admissibility. Little more than the
passage of time was necessary for eventual universal acceptance. In
the next ten years twelve more states joined. And by the end of the
1930's all but five states were formal members of the club. 62
These cases, germinal not only for fingerprint identification but
for the many other forensic individualization techniques soon to spawn
in its path, invested little effort assessing the merits of the proffered
scientific evidence. Rather, for the most part, these courts casually
cited treatises on criminal investigation, or general approval of science,
or, eventually, other cases admitting such evidence.
For example, in Jennings, expert opinion based on fingerprints
was the principal ground of identification. The court recognized the
novelty of the expertise at issue, noting that "the courts of this country
do not appear to have had occasion to pass on the question."'1 In up-
holding the- admissibility of fingerprint expertise, the Jennings court
cited two general encyclopedias,' three treatises on crime investiga-
tion methods,'6' and one recent English case.' 66 Nowhere in the opin-
ion, however, does the court articulate the basis of the expertise it is
evaluating, or discuss any scientific evidence bearing on the empirical
claims, or illuminate the technique's theoretical premises, or explain
155. Recall that once these concepts were accepted on behalf of fingerprint identifica-
tion, numerous other forensic individualization areas made the same claim by analogizing
themselves to fingerprints. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
157. 96 N.E. 1077 (I. 1911).
158. See State v. Cerciello, 90 A. 1112,1115 (NJ. 1914).
159. See People v. Roach, 109 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1915).
160. See State v. Kuhl, 175 P. 190,195-96 (Nev. 1918).
161. See McGarry v. State, 200 S.W. 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918).
162. The cases are collected at FAIGMAN Er AL., supra note 15, § 21-1.0 n.9.
163. Jennings, 96 N.E. at 1081.
164. See 10 ENCY. BRrrANNICA 376 (11th ed., 1910); 5 NELSON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 28
(1907).
165. See HANS GROSS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 277 (Adams' transl., 1907);
LEONHARD FELIX FULD, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 342 (1909); OSBORN, supra note 133,
at 479.
166. See In re Castleton's, 3 Crim. App. 74 (1909).
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why anyone should believe that fingerprint examiners can do what they
claim the ability to do. Nor do the cited sources fill that gap."67 In addi-
tion, the court also referred to four experts who testified on behalf of
fingerprint identification, each of whom had been studying or practic-
ing fingerprint examination for three to four years before the trial.' "
But the court's opinion shares nothing of what, if anything, these wit-
nesses had to say on the validity of fingerprint identification.
Here is the totality of what the court had to say in its review of the
asserted science of fingerprint identification:
These authorities state that this system of identification is of very
ancient origin, having been used in Egypt when the impression of
the monarch's thumb was used as his sign manual, that it has been
used in the courts of India for many years and more recently in the
courts of several European countries; that in recent years its use
has become very general by the police departments of the large
cities of this country and Europe; [of] the great success of the sys-
tem in England, where it has been used since 1891 in thousands of
169cases without error ....
Based on the preceding, the Jennings court concluded:
We are disposed to hold from the evidence of the four witnesses
who testified, and from the writings we have referred to on this
subject, that there is a scientific basis for the system of finger print
identification, and that the courts are justified in admitting this class
170of evidence ....
Since the opinion is without any empirical or theoretical sub-
stance, how can the court or a reader of the opinion be persuaded of
the existence of the asserted expertise? With equal ease, the court
could have satisfied itself as to the validity of astrology.
The second American case to consider the admissibility of finger-
print evidence, State v. Cerciello,"7' neither cited nor explained anything
167. Nor would one expect them to. With the possible exception of Osborn's treatise on
handwriting, supra note 133, they do not even purport to be presentations of the basic sci-
ence underlying techniques of crime investigation.
168. See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (Ill. 1911).
169. Id. at 1081. The allusion to "thousands of cases without error" obviously begs the
question of validity. In actual disputed cases it rarely, if ever, is possible to tell whether the
identification was correct or not; that is why the issue was before the factfinder. This has
been a major problem in validating many forensic techniques. See sources cited at note 96.
supra. For discussions of this problem, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. U.S.
CONGRESS, THE SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A RESEARCH REVIEw
AND EVALUATION 29-43 (1983); John Thornton, Courts of Law v. Courts of Science: A Fo-
rensic Scientist's Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
QUARTERLY 480 (1994). Take Jennings itself as an example: How might one confirm
whether fingerprint identification was in error or not? There is no criterion against which to
test the correctness of the examiner's conclusion.
170. Jennings, 96 N.E. at 1082.
171. 90A. 1112(N.J. 1914).
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whatsoever concerning the expertise at issue. This court's scientific as-
sessment was nothing more than a generalized endorsement of scien-
tific progress:
[Ilts admission as legal evidence is based upon the theory that the
evolution in practical affairs of life, whereby the progressive and
scientific tendencies of the age are manifest in every other depart-
ment of human endeavor, cannot be ignored in legal procedure, but
that the law, in its efforts to enforce justice by demonstrating a fact
in issue, will allow evidence of those scientific processes which are
the work of educated and skillful men in their various depart-
ments ....172
So much for the Cerciello court's scientific reasoning. The court's
legal reasoning amounted to this: the admission of expert opinion,
"one of the prominent exceptions of the general rules of evidence,""
was permitted on so many other matters that the court could hardly re-
fuse to permit another exception. Moreover, the jury could be relied
upon to give the testimony whatever weight was appropriate 74
The Roach court did no more than to cite Castleton and
Jennings.175 Concerning the latter, the Roach court commented,
credulously: "The opinion of Chief Justice Carter in that case contains
an instructive and learned discussion of this whole subject."'76 The
opinion offers no citations to any scientific materials or any discussion
of the principles claimed to be the foundation of the technique. The
court focused on the "qualifications" of the witness rather than the
content of the science." The court held: "In view of the progress that
has been made by scientific students and those charged with the detec-
tion of crime in police departments.., we cannot rule as a matter of
law that such evidence is incompetent.'
78
In Texas, McGarry v. State"19 rested its opinion squarely on
Jennings, literally adopting the Illinois opinion as its own." After
quoting at length from Jennings, McGarry held simply: "We conclude
that the evidence of the witness was admissible."'81
The quality of judicial scrutiny of fingerprint evidence rarely ex-
172. Id. at 1114.
173. Id.
174. By what magic of intuition the jury was to do this we can only guess, since the jury
would learn even less about the subject than the court had.
175. See People v. Roach, 109 N.E. 618,623 (N.Y. 1915).
176. Id-
177. See id. ("Before testifying to his opinion as to the identity... the witness explained
fully his qualifications, specified the circumstances upon which he predicated his opinion,
and swore that he was able to express an opinion with reasonable certainty.").
178. Id.
179. 200 S.W. 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918).
180. See id. at 528-30.
181. Id. at 530.
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ceeded that of Jennings, and sometimes it fell far shorter. While some
cases made reference to actual early research studies on fingerprints,'
others cited Mark Twain's novel, Pudd'nhead W¢Vilson, 83 as authority for
the infallibility of fingerprint evidence,' 8' or appealed to far higher
authority:
"God's finger print language," the voiceless speech, and the indeli-
ble writing imprinted on the fingers, hand palms, and foot soles of
humanity by the All-Wise Creator for some good and useful pur-
pose... [namely,] the ultimate elimination of crime... [by] un-
questionable evidence of identity in all cases.185
Before long, courts had ample precedents from sister jurisdictions
to cite as authority for the infallibility of fingerprint evidence. Popular
and judicial intuitions about fingerprints are so strong that not a case
can be found that entertains any serious doubt about the scientific per-
fection that has been achieved by fingerprint examination."
What is disappointing about the fingerprint admissibility cases is
that these courts made no serious, substantive inquiry into the body of
knowledge on which they had the responsibility to pass judgment.
Of course, what is found in the opinions has a lot to do with the
legal test applied. The reasoning of the earliest cases amounts to:
"We're letting so much else in, we might as well let this in, too." Un-
like the Frye court, these courts did not seem to realize the legal nov-
elty of the situation before them: proffered expert witnesses who had
not come from a commercial marketplace in which they had proven
themselves. Later cases had the illusory luxury of precedent, reasoning
in effect: "Courts in other states are letting in fingerprint evidence, so
we can too." The Frye test would not have produced much more. The
Frye test would have required these courts to ask whether people in the
field of fingerprint examination believed in fingerprint examination,
and they would have found that fingerprint examiners did. The court
still would have been looking at something other than the science of
182. See, e.g., GALTON, supra note 86; SIR WILLIAM J. HERSCHEL, THE ORIGIN OF
FINGER PRINTING (Ams Press ed., 1974) (1916); HENRY FAULDS, GUIDE TO FINGER-
PRINT IDENTIFICATION (1905).
183. MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON (Bantam 1981) (1894).
184. See State v. Kuhl, 175 P. 190, 191 (Nev. 1918); Stacy v. State, 292 P. 885, 886 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1930).
185. Kuhl, 175 P. at 191 (quoting approvingly from FREDERIC AUGUSTUS BRAYLEY,
BRAYLEY'S ARRANGEMENT OF FINGER PRINTS IDENTIFICATION AND THEIR USES, FOR
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, PRISONS, LAWYERS, BANKS, HOMES, TRUST COMPANIES... AND
IN EVERY BRANCH OF BUSINESS WHERE AN INFALLIBLE SYSTEM OF IDENTIFICATION IS
NECESSARY (1909)). In fairness to the Kuhl court it must be noted that its opinion was per-
haps the most erudite, citing some of the most scholarly works on fingerprints-as well as
some of the silliest.
186. See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 518 (fingerprint identification is "univer-
sally admitted in this country").
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the matter.
Certain habits of judicial thought interfered with the courts' in-
quiries about this, as well as any other, purported science. One is the
inclination of a court to be content to cite supportive precedents, rather
than to look into the content, the logic, the reasoning of the cited
opinions, at least when the judges' initial inclinations appear to be rein-
forced by the other cases. Where a precedent is a command from a
court above, of course, a court below has little choice but to obey. But
where a precedent is from a sister state, and therefore has only persua-
sive value, the cogency of the opinion is everything. The courts of
other states that contented themselves with citing Jennings and its
progeny were being lazy. Jennings itself, and other very early cases,
made a similar mistake in citing encyclopedias and treatises, as if citing
those is the same as citing a case from a court above. Those are not
law, at least not unless and until a court makes a finding of legislative
fact and thereby makes them an integral part of a holding.' Those
courts had a duty to make a serious, intellectually defensible, inquiry
into the subject matter, a duty they failed to discharge.
A modem court, compelled to apply the conventional scientific
criteria required by Daubert, would find no help in the earlier cases.
Nor would the research literature on fingerprints, nearly a century
later, provide the support a modem court would be searching for.
Consider what a well respected, scientifically literate, scholar and prac-
titioner of fingerprint examination has written:
Efforts to assess the individuality of DNA typing make an excel-
lent contrast [to fingerprint identification]. There has been [con-
cerning DNA typing] intense debate over which statistical models
are to be applied, and how one should quantify increasingly rare
events. To many, the absence of adequate statistical modeling, or
the controversy regarding calculations, brings the admissibility of
the evidence into question. Woe to fingerprint practice were such
criteria applied! As noted earlier, about a dozen models for quanti-
fication of fingerprint individuality have been proposed. None of
these even approaches theoretical adequacy, however, and none
has been subjected to empirical validation. Apart from illustration
of the intense variability in fingerprint patterns, and the inability of
simple minutia counts to quantify this variability, these models oc-
cupy no role in the routine professional practice of fingerprint ex-
amination. Indeed, inasmuch as a statistical method would suggest
qualified (non-absolute) opinions, the models are rejected on prin-
ciple by the fingerprint profession.1
Although in principle fingerprint identification depends upon an
objective, probabilistic inquiry, its practitioners use no probability
187. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
188. Stoney, supra note 85, § 21-2.3.1.
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models and have no probability data to use. They rely on intuition and
assumptions. 9 that have not been tested rigorously, and they persist in
treating identifications as absolute, not probabilistic."
Fingerprint evidence may present courts applying Daubert with
their most extreme dilemma. By conventional scientific standards, any
serious search for evidence of the validity of fingerprint identification
is going to be disappointing. Yet the intuitions that underlie finger-
print examination, and the subjective judgments on which specific case
opinions are based, are powerful. When and if a court agrees to revisit
the admissibility of fingerprint identification evidence under Daubert,
the Daubert approach-that courts may admit scientific evidence only
if it meets contemporary standards of what constitutes science-is
likely to meet its most demanding test: A vote to admit fingerprints is
a rejection of conventional science as the criterion for admission.' 9' A
vote for science is a vote to exclude fingerprint expert opinions.
C. Toolmarks: Reversals without Reasons
Tool mark experts compare markings left at crime scenes by vari-
ous kinds of tools to similar tools in the possession of suspects in order
to try to determine if the suspect's knife or crowbar or wire cutters or
whatever left the marks found at the crime scene.
One of the earliest appellate decisions to consider the admissibil-
ity of modern tool mark identification expertise was State v. Fasick,r a
Washington State case which, in 1928, rejected the proffered testi-
mony. 93 In that case, a murder had been committed and the body cov-
ered with fir branches cut from nearby trees.'94 The government of-
fered Luke S. May, a pioneering forensic scientist who would become
one of the founders of tool mark identification.'95 May had made sam-
ple cuttings of fir branches with the suspect's knife and examined mi-
croscopic marks left by the blade, comparing them with the marks left
189. "The criteria for absolute identification of an individual through fingerprint com-
parison are wholly dependent on the professional judgment of a fingerprint examiner. When
a fingerprint examiner determines that there is enough corresponding detail to warrant the
conclusion of absolute identification, then the criteria have been met." Id.
190. "Our standard is a popularly held concept based on subjective criteria and empiri-
cally successful practice, not one that was reached though conventional scientific experimen-
tation and statistical evaluation." Id.
191. And Daubert with it.
192. See 270 P. 123 (Wash. 1928), afJd, 274 P. 712 (Wash. 1929).
193. See id. at 124.
194. See id.
195. The dust jacket to his semi-autobiographical book on forensic science characterizes
May as "America's Sherlock Holmes." LUKE S. MAY, CRIME'S NEMESIS (1936).
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in the branches found covering the body. 96 He concluded that the
crime scene branches had been cut with the same knife, thus tending to
place the defendant at the crime scene." The trial court initially ex-
cluded, but later admitted, May's testimony.98 The Washington Su-
preme Court, however, found the logic behind the expert's opinion un-
convincing. Wrote the Court: "[You] could not tell in a thousand
years whether the two pieces were cut by the same knife."' 99 On re-
hearing a year later, the Court affirmed its initial rejection of tool mark
identification expertise.2'
Eighteen months after deciding Fasick and only six months after
re-affirming itself, in State v. Clark, 1 the Washington Supreme Court
was presented with remarkably similar evidence, this time in the con-
text of a rape case in which fir boughs and saplings had been cut and
used by a rapist to construct a blind from which to attack his victim.'
Again a knife, again cut fir branches, again Luke May the proffered
expert witness. 3 But this time the Court held that expert opinion
about whether the defendant's knife cut the branches was admissible:
"The photomicrographs ... conclusively establish, we are convinced,
as doubtless the jury were, that the cuts were made with the same
blade." 2" Although the Clark court superficially distinguishes the Fa-
sick case in its opinion, the court failed to explain what changed in its
understanding of the scientific claims of tool mark identification, refer-
ring only to the larger number of striation comparisons examined in
the latter case.
In an article written the same year Clark was decided, May dis-
cussed the case, describing what he had offered to the court. 5 He as-
serted that he had "conclusively established" that the same knife was
used. His inference of that identification was derived by familiar prob-
abilistic reasoning:
Invoking the law of probabilities, using the algebraic formula for
determining combinations and permutations, with only one-third of
the marks here shown as factors, there would be only "one" chance
of there being another blade exactly like this if every one of the
hundred million people in the United States had six hundred and
196. See Fasick, 270 P. at 124.
197. See id
198. See idt
199. Id (quoting the trial court).
200. See id
201. 287 P. 18 (Wash. 1930).
202. See idt at 18-19.
203. See id; May, supra note 79, at 258.
204. See Clark, 287 P. at 20.
205. See May, supra note 79, at 253-59.
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fifty quadrillion knives each. 206
Several years later, after praising the Clark court for making an
"outstanding progressive decision," a "significant step forward, 20 7 May
described the Clark opinion as "a precedent which has already been
cited in criminal trials in many other states, thereby legally advancing
science in its battle against crime.' '21 While it may be that Clark was
called to the attention of some trial judges, the opinion did not, and
perhaps surprisingly so, become the icon for the admission of tool
mark expert evidence as, say, Jennings had become for fingerprints.
Clark was cited in only two subsequent appellate oinions, and not for
propositions that would have pleased Luke May. Somehow Clark
went from standing for the "conclusive" power of tool mark identifica-
tion evidence in 1930 to standing for the admissibility of "a less than
exact" process in 1985.210
There is little if anything in the Clark opinion that could help a
judge in a subsequent case to understand why May's claims about a
science of tool mark identification were valid. The case merely offered
the conclusory and unexplained enthusiasm of a Court that only
months before had rendered an opposite opinion on the very same
question."' Both the exclusion of the purported science in Fasick and
its admission in Clark are unexplained. If the purpose of writing judi-
cial opinions is to explain a court's reasons for reaching its holding, and
not merely to enigmatically announce its conclusions, the court failed
in both of these cases to meet its obligations.1 2 Readers lacking clair-
206. Id. at 255. This means one chance in 6.5 x 10 (that is, 65 septillion; 65 followed by
24 zeroes). May does not explain how he made this calculation, but it is worth noting that
this is far, far more diagnostic than DNA fingerprinting claims to be.
207. May, supra note 195, at 47.
208. Id. at 53. Unfortunately, he misses the chance to teach us something about the con-
trast in the court's thinking from Fasick to Clark because he does not mention Fasick at all.
209. See Hansel v. Ford Motor Co., 473 P.2d 219, 226 (Wash. App. 1970) (a case not in-
volving toolmarks at all); State v. Bernson, 700 P.2d 758, 764 (Wash. App. 1985) (standing
for the proposition that "[a]n expert's use of 'could have' or 'possibility' has been allowed in
other cases where a less than exact scientific process is involved").
210. Bernson, 700 P.2d at 764.
211. Yet the Clark court was ebullient in its praise of this new specie of evidence:
Courts are no longer skeptical that by the aid of scientific appliances the identity
of a person may be established by finger prints. There is no difference in princi-
ple in the utilization of the photomicrograph to determine that the same tool
that made one impression is the same instrument that made another impression.
The edge on one blade differs as greatly from the edge on another blade as the
lines on one human hand differ from the lines on another. This is a progressive
age. The scientific means afforded should be used to apprehend the criminal.
State v. Clark, 287 P. 18, 20 (1930). Nor do the briefs submitted to the Court provide clues
as to what changed so dramatically in the court's understanding of toolmark identification
from Fasick to Clark.
212. We can be sure that the changed outcome was not due to changed personnel of the
[Vol. 49
MERLIN AND SOLOMON
voyance will never understand why the court believed that tool mark
identification expertise did not, and then did, exist.
After so interesting a start in the case law, the subject of the valid-
ity of tool mark identification evidence has had surprisingly little ap-
pellate exposure in the decades since. From Fasick in 1929 to Ramirez
v. State" in 1989, no other cases excluding tool mark identification evi-
dence are to be found.
The first federal court to pass on the question did so in 1978 in
Fletcher v. Lane.214 In Fletcher, the defendant challenged a tool mark
expert's positive identification of a screwdriver found in the defen-
dant's home as the one that made pry marks on the victim's door, to
the exclusion of all other screwdrivers in the world.21 The defense ar-
gued that such an assertion was insupportable, or at least unsupported,
on scientific grounds, and therefore should not have been admitted.
The trial judge converted this challenge from one of scientific validity
to one of credibility: "Petitioner's... contention is essentially an at-
tack on the credibility of the expert testimony. The credibility of a wit-
ness is a matter for jury determination .... 6
An example of the error into which courts may go by so casually
scrutinizing expert testimony is provided by Commonwealth v.
Graves.217 In this case, expert testimony was offered that scratch marks
on the neck of a victim of strangulation matched the defendant's fin-
gernail21 1 The defendant challenged this testimony as lacking sufficient
scientific recognition to meet the general acceptance standard.21 9 The
Pennsylvania court turned away the challenge, concluding:
[T]he methods and techniques used ... all were consistent with
standards of general scientific acceptance in the field of tool-marks,
of which, according to the witnesses, testimony as to finger nail
wounds is a part.2
But consider this comment on the case:
The Pennsylvania reviewing court, however, completely failed to
recognize that the class characteristics of the fingernail and the
scratch marks, although similar, lacked the necessary individual
markings to tie the accused's fingernail to the scratch marks on the
court. Three of the votes for exclusion in Fasick became votes for admission in Clark, in-
cluding one by the author of Fasick.
213. 542 So. 2d 352,354-55 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
214. 446 F. Supp. 729 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
215. See id at 731.
216. Id. The same rationale can be found in Potter v. State, 416 So. 2d 773, 777 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982) (leaving to jury's discretion weight to be given toolmark expert's opinion
regarding ax used in murder).
217. 456 A.2d 561 (Pa. Super. 1983).
218. See id at 565.
219. See id. at 566.
220. Id
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victim to the exclusion of all others.22'
Ramirez v. State222 is a rare instance of a court rejecting the opinion
testimony of tool mark experts on the ground that a scientific basis for
the testimony had not been established. In this case, the government
sought to prove that the defendant's knife was the murder weapon by
showing that the knife matched microscopic striations on the victim's
cartilage, to the exclusion of all other knives: "[W]e find that no scien-
tific predicate was established from independent evidence to show that




Cases such as this, requiring an adequate scientific basis to be estab-
lished before allowing opinions based on that scientific predicate to go
to the jury, have been rare in the judicial review of tool mark expert
evidence.
In all, judicial opinions purporting to examine the scientific evi-
dence on which tool mark expertise rests are remarkably few and the
resulting opinions tellingly uninformative. While it is apparent that
expert evidence on tool marks and firearms identification is universally
admissible today, it is equally obvious that this universal admissibility
has been accomplished without judicial evaluation of the validity of the
underlying science or its application.
The absence of intelligible scrutiny is made unusually clear by the
Fasick and Clark opinions. In the space of six months, in a pair of
cases remarkably similar on their facts, a state supreme court went
from confidently excluding to confidently admitting tool mark expert
testimony, and in neither opinion did the court explain what led to its
conclusions.224 These opinions suggest that the judges do not lack
strong feelings about the evidence, but they do lack sufficient under-
standing of the asserted basis of the opinion to enable them to explain
why they are persuaded of its validity. These are disbelievers, or be-
lievers, without understanding.
Appellate courts have a duty not only to make decisions but to
give the best explanation they can of their reasons for the decision.
The absence of explanations undermines the opinion (no reasoning
221. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 379-80. See also James Starrs, Procedure in
Identifying Fingernail Imprint in Human Skin Survives Appellate Review, 6 AM. J. FORENSIC
MED. & PATHOLOGY 171, 172-73 (1985) (explaining that the presence of class, but not indi-
vidual, characteristics, meant that a large number of fingernails in addition to the defen-
dant's would have matched equally well).
222. 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995).
223. Id. at 354-55. The court specifically rejected State v. Churchill, 646 P.2d 1049 (Kan.
1982), because the Kansas court admitted toolmark identification evidence without first es-
tablishing the necessary scientific reliability predicate. See Ramirez, 542 So. 2d at 355. The
Ramirez exclusion, however, was reversed on appeal. See Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164
(Fla. 1995).
224. See supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
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cannot be good reasoning) and deprives other courts of the incre-
mental benefits of the thinking of prior courts that have struggled with
the same problem. Being explicit about understanding and reasoning
allows commentators and other courts to evaluate whether the opinion
is correct or incorrect. To expose the wisdom or foolishness of one's
thinking to the scrutiny of others may fill one with trepidation, espe-
cially when venturing into unfamiliar territory, but it is necessary to do
if the law is to remain public and to work its way toward being more
rational.
Silence about reasons is unusual behavior for appellate courts,
which rarely are at a loss for explanations of their reasoning. This
seems to further suggest that the courts recognized their duty to decide
but either lacked the capacity to reason about the evidence or were not
adequately informed by the parties. Courts have tools they can employ
to try to better inform themselves: a visit to the library to examine the
scientific literature, special masters, and requiring the parties to re-
brief the court, among others. However great the challenge of such
materials, the court's duty is to find a way to meet the challenge, not
avoid it.
Later appellate courts evaded the responsibility of gatekeeping al-
together, deferring either to the discretion of the trial court or to the
jury, or by suggesting that there are no limits to the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. As discussed earlier,' the decision to categorically ex-
clude or admit scientific evidence is a decision of law, of legislative fact
not adjudicative fact, and it therefore falls squarely within the province
of the reviewing court. Moreover, the trial court has an independent
responsibility to evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony. The
jury's task, and its responsibility to try to understand and weigh the
evidence, will come soon enough. But because it is coming, the judge is
not excused from having to perform the court's gatekeeping role. Ar-
guments that because there is expertise on everything, everything must
therefore come in, are not likely to be accepted by any court any more.
Lines must be drawn and articulated by courts or legislatures. To flesh
out the contours of those lines, courts have a duty to explain how they
determined on which side of that line any given asserted expertise fell.
Finally, at least one of these cases illustrates an attempt to use a
legal tool to resolve scientific uncertainties when the tool simply is not
up to the job. The Fletcher court's conflation of an attack on the scien-
tific foundation of an expert's testimony with an attack on the expert's
credibility fails to recognize that credibility is incapable of assessing
225. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
226. If the Fletcher court were correct, then the entire body of law and commentary on
the issue of the admissibility of scientific evidence, including Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
could simply be dropped into the wastebasket and the whole matter referred to the jury.
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the validity of science. It is one thing to evaluate the truthfulness of lay
witnesses on issues of adjudicative fact by resorting to their credibility.
But the existence or meaning of a body of asserted scientific knowl-
edge does not depend on the credibility of the witness. Such a stance
betrays not only ignorance of the scientific subject matter but also
hopelessness about ever being able to understand it. Contrast this to a
court hearing the legal arguments of counsel. The court does not ask
itself if counsel is "credible," it asks itself if it the arguments are sound.
Science is like that to scientists. In listening to colleagues debate an is-
sue, scientists do not ask themselves which side is more credible, they
ask themselves which side is making the most persuasive arguments,
given the body of empirical evidence and theory that are the materials
they have to work with. Courts should be evaluating science much as
scientists do, and much as they evaluate the arguments of lawyers. For
this job, credibility is a useless tool.227
D. Voiceprints: Judicial Cacophony
The claim of "voiceprint" identification is that each person's vocal
apparatus is unique and therefore the voice sounds each person makes
are unique. By converting voice sounds to a visual display, using spec-
trographic equipment, the examiner can compare tracings and deter-
mine the identity of the person who uttered the questioned voice.
Judicial opinions on the admissibility of such voice identification
expertise are widely divided. At present, by my count, expert testi-
mony based on voice spectrographic analysis is admissible in six
states -2 and excluded in eight;2- admissible in four federal circuits'
and excluded in one.3 No consistent or coherent judicial view has
evolved over time nor does a consistent view appear likely to emerge
in the foreseeable future. The history of the courts' divergent re-
sponses to voice spectrography is instructive.
227. The one exception to this would seem to be with respect to the credibility of a study
(not the witness). One may not believe the findings of a particular study. For example. one
may think that a study funded by a particular interest biases the study. If so, that presuma-
bly is because the study was designed to produce favorable results, rather than a fair test,
and a researcher should be able to see that in the design, so it still is a matter of intelligent
scrutiny, not mere credibility. The worst situation would be where one does not believe a
study because one thinks the researcher lied about the findings, and reported false results.
That is presumed to be rare because nothing could be more destructive to the entire institu-
tion of science than "fudging," or "dry-labbing." The fact that there are words for such in-
tellectual crimes suggests that they do occur.
228. Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island. See Appendix.
229. Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. See Appendix.
230. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh. See Appendix.
231. The District of Columbia. See Appendix.
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The accompanying table of Scientific Voice Identification Cases
(see Appendix) lists the major voice identification opinions in chrono-
logical order, along with other information about the cases.
First, the Table reveals that there is no greater agreement in re-
cent years than there was in the earliest days of voice spectrography.
Of the first ten courts to consider the technique, six admitted it and
four excluded it. The most recent ten to consider it were evenly di-
vided on admission or exclusion. Second, we can see that the legal test
of admissibility applied by the courts is highly correlated with the
holding. 2
Of the courts that claimed to apply the Frye test in a broad fash-
ion-that is, treated the relevant scientific community as consisting of a
range of relevant fields 3 and not merely the one narrowly concerned
with performing the particular application that constitutes the tech-
nique at issue-only one admitted expert testimony of voice identifica-
tion.' And vice-versa. Of courts that employed the Frye test nar-
rowly-narrowing the relevant scientific field to "those expected to
know," that is, those which perform the specific application at issue-
not one excluded the testimony. 5 These two versions of the Frye test,
and their predictably opposite conclusions, illustrate one of the familiar
criticisms of Frye, namely, that defining the relevant scientific fields
broadly or narrowly largely dictates the conclusion that will be
reached.
Of courts that claimed to employ a "relevancy" or "reliability"
test-frequently equated, at least in the past, with the test embodied in
the Federal Rules of Evidence-thirteen admittede 6 voice identifica-
tion expert testimony and three excluded 7 it. What courts required
for the expertise to be sufficiently "reliable" varied considerably. Most
concluded that as long as there was something to be said on behalf of
voice identification, that was enough to let it in. One court noted only
that the witness was a credentialed expert and cited other jurisdictions
that had admitted such testimony.' Using a similarly minimal thresh-
old, however, another court excluded the evidence, concluding that its
almost presumptive reliability was outweighed by its risk of being given
232. Notice that I merely say "correlated." I venture no guess as to which came first:
the rule to be applied, or the conclusion about admissibility.
233. Concerning voice spectrography, that could mean acoustical engineering, anat-
omy, electrical engineering, linguistics, phonetics, physics, physiology, psychology, and
statistics because the technique of voice spectrography made assumptions about or bor-
rowed principles from each of these fields.
234. See cases cited in Appendix.
235. See cases cited in Appendix.
236. See cases cited in Appendix.
237. See cases cited in Appendix.
238. See United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348,352-53 (7th Cir. 1989).
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excessive weight by factfinders.39 Yet another court gave the scientific
evidence on the proffered expertise a close and thoughtful examina-
tion, much like what the Daubert gloss on the Federal Rules would
seem to require, and concluded that voice identification expert testi-
mony was inadmissible.4
Finally, there were courts that employed the test suggested by
McCormick, that is, admissibility based essentially on logical relevancy
under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and exclusion if probative value
was substantially outweighed by the concerns invoked by Federal Rule
of Evidence 403.241 Every court employing this kind of test found voice
identification expert testimony admissible.2
Some opinions reached their conclusions without employing a dis-
cernible legal test.43
The mere fact that some courts refused to admit voice identifica-
tion expert evidence is itself significant in light of the traditional recep-
tiveness of the courts to forensic individuation techniques. Why has
voice identification been treated differently? Several interconnected
answers are plausible.
One may be that more judges have grown more thoughtful and
discerning and less credulous about scientific offerings than their judi-
cial ancestors had been. Numerous courts evaluating asserted voice
identification expertise were critical of witnesses (testifying in favor of
admissibility) who were mere technicians rather than educated scien-
tists, 24 4 or whose livelihoods depended upon continued admission of the
technique, or who came from a very small and incestuous circle of
proponents of the technique. 6
239. See State v. Free, 493 So.2d 781,787-88 (La. App. 1986).
240. See People v. Collins, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
241. McCormick's test for scientific evidence admissibility states that:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of
scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Any relevant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are distinct reasons for exclusions. These rea-
sons are the familiar ones of prejudicing or misleading the jury or consuming
undue amounts of time.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 608 (3d ed. 1984).
242. See cases cited in Appendix.
243. See cases cited in Appendix.
244. "[The expert witness's] qualifications are those of a technician and law enforce-
ment officer, not a scientist." People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Cal. 1976) (emphasis
in original).
245. See id. at 1249. Compare this to the narrow version of the Frye test, which essen-
tially asks the practitioners of a technique if they have sufficient confidence in their own
work that they should be allowed to continue earning income from it.
246. See id. Of course, these shortcomings do not distinguish talker identification
from most other forensic individuation techniques when they were gaining admission to
the courts. Indeed, all but the third criticism continues to be true for them.
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Another factor is that the literature of voice spectrography, both
supporting and questioning the technique, was more quantified and
qualified than earlier courts had received about earlier forensic indi-
viduation techniques. This is because many of the people involved in
voice identification came from fields that had a tradition of empirical
testing of their ideas.' Indeed, more research was available to the
courts about voice identification expertise than for any forensic indi-
viduation field that preceded it. 9  This immediately provided the
courts with unusual resources with which to comprehend the imperfec-
tions of the technique.2 In providing rigorous self-criticisms of its own
concepts and methods (which all good science does), a field aids the
courts greatly in making a more informed and sober assessment of the
field and its likely contribution to the judicial fact-finding process."
Moreover, a field that develops out of an industrial or academic re-
search tradition tends to conduct more research; a greater volume of
research tends to produce a more complex and qualified impression of
the technique in the mind of the court.
In the face of actual data, the courts had a real choice to make.
Although the technique could reduce uncertainty in identification, it
also was demonstrably less than perfect. Errors were going to be
made, and, unlike other fields of forensic individuation, voice identifi-
cation proponents said so.23 The courts had concrete error rates to
247. "Qualified" in the sense of limited, restricted, or circumspect. See Raymond
Kent & Michael Chial, Talker Identification, § 25-2.0, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997)
(reviewing the empirical research).
248. For evidence of this, the reader is referred to the nearest university library to ex-
amine a journal article in acoustical engineering, linguistics, perceptual psychology, etc., and
to compare them to articles in the forensic sciences.
249. Compare the various forensic identification sciences reviewed in FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 15.
250. The same was true for DNA typing, and was not true for most other forensic in-
dividuation techniques.
251. When other fields lack such critiques, is that because there is nothing to ques-
tion? Or because an uninformed and unquestioning consensus developed among mem-
bers of the field? And how can courts distinguish between the two possibilities?
252. This presents a paradox: All else equal, the better a field studies and critiques
itself, the more skeptical the courts' impression of it will be. The less a field understands
what it is doing and what the limits are on its own capabilities, the more positive an im-
pression the courts will develop of the field. For a number of the more conventional fo-
rensic individuation techniques, there is still no tradition of self-scrutiny or a literature of
the results of rigorous testing which can inform the courts. At least in terms of their con-
tinued acceptance by the courts, those fields have nothing to gain and much to lose by
adopting a tradition of inquiry, testing, and skepticism.
253. "Possibly, no combination of methods may ever produce absolutely positive
identifications or eliminations in 100% of the cases submitted." Oscar I. Tosi, The Prob-
lem of Speaker Identification and Elimination, in MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES IN
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evaluate. M How good is good enough? How much error is too much?
The law provides no standards for making that assessment. A tech-
nique that committed five false positive errors for every 100 decisions
may be viewed by some courts as more than adequate and by other
courts as not nearly good enough.
Finally, the courts may have been overwhelmed by the studies.
Although more research means a greater potential to understand the
scientific questions at issue, it also may have confused some (or many)
courts, which have limited capacity and limited time to interpret and
evaluate the empirical studies. If this were the problem, help was on
the way. 25Unique assistance in evaluating the available data came into
being only a decade after voice identification made its first appearance
in the courts. Help came in the form of a careful review of voice spec-
trography by the National Academy of Sciences. A panel of highly
knowledgeable scientists from diverse relevant fields was formed; they
carefully reviewed the relevant scientific literature; and they published
their report. 6 Although the Report wisely declined to make a specific
recommendation concerning admissibility-appreciating that to do so
called for value judgments ' that should be made by the law, not
usurped by scientists-the Report nevertheless could not be said to
have given a good report card on the state of voiceprint analysis.
Among other things, it concluded:
[The assumption] that intraspeaker variability is less than ... inter-
speaker variability.., is not adequately supported by scientific...
data.2' 8
Estimates of error rates now available pertain to only a few of the
many combinations of situations encountered in real-life situations.
These estimates do not constitute a generally adequate basis for a ju-
SPEECH, HEARING, AND LANGUAGE 399, 428 (Sadanand Singh ed., 1975).
254. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (stating that an
admissibility criterion for a technique is its "known or potential rate of error."). Until very
recently, such information was completely unavailable for most forensic science. See
PETERSON ET AL., supra note 96.
255. Up until that time. There have subsequently been two NAS panels formed to
review the data on the technique of DNA typing. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996).
256. See COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION
(1979).
257. Most notably: How much uncertainty or known rates of error are disqualifying for
the purposes of trial?
258. COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, supra note 256, at 2.
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dicial or legislative body to use in making judgments concerning the
reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identification in fo-
rensic applications. 7
Upon publication of the report, the FBI ceased performing voice
identification for the purpose of offering testimony in court,"' and it
was expected, that the courts would stop admitting voice identifica-
tion expert, testimony, at least until the scientific support for it im-
proved.'2 Of the eleven judicial opinions written since release of the
NAS report, however, half admitted the expert testimony.' Still more
troubling, most of those opinions make no mention whatever of the
NAS review," and only one of the two that did cite it appears actually
to have read it. In short, for the most part, the courts decided the
post-NAS cases just as they decided the pre-NAS cases, that is, as if the
report did not exist. 66
Only among the voice identification cases do we see modem
courts rejecting claims of forensic identification expertise in large
numbers. In attempting to account for this, it is tempting to suppose
that judges have become more skeptical or better informed, or that the
lawyers practicing before them have. Perhaps on appreciating the
greater complexity of a claimed identification science, or better under-
standing how difficult it is to prove the empirical claims, or on recog-
nizing the difference between technicians and scientists, or the possible
strains on the objectivity of members of fields whose very existence
depends on the credulity of judges, many courts are not persuaded.
Several considerations make this explanation doubtful, at least as
a general matter.f7 One is the opinions themselves. Reading them
does not suggest to a reader much greater scientific literacy than ex-
isted earlier in the century. A second reason is the extraordinarily dif-
ferent fate of the next field to be considered, bite mark identification,
259. See id at 60.
260. See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, at 645. But, as with the polygraph, they
continued doing spectrographic tests for investigative purposes. See id. at 645 n.30.
261. See id. at 645.
262. Few if any of the scientific shortcomings raised by the report have been solved by
subsequent research. See Kent & Chial, supra note 247, § 25-2.3.
263. See cases cited in Appendix.
264. See cases cited in Appendix.
265. See State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1235-36 (Ariz. 1984). The Maivia court's
discounting of the NAS report based on the idea that it had grown dated assumed that
more informative research had changed the picture. Even to the present, however, that
has not come about. See Kent & Chial, supra note 247, § 25-2.3.
266. Whether this reflects the shortcomings of counsel (for not drawing the courts'
attention to the NAS study and the significance of its findings) or the courts (for not
finding it themselves, or not appreciating its value to their decisions), I am unable to say.
267. That is to say, some individual opinions are impressive in their thoughtful grasp of
the scientific issues. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 405 N.Y.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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which made its entry into the courts at about the same time.2' And,
perhaps most convincing, is the massive failure of the courts after 1979,
or the lawyers practicing before those courts, 261 to take note of, and
then either learn from or thoughtfully reject, the National Academy of
Sciences study on the very subject these courts were called upon to
rule.27
What actually may distinguish the voice identification cases is that,
unlike all of the other forensic identification sciences27' the courts had
seen, the founders of spectrographic voice identification produced
studies which could be presented to the courts, showing weaknesses as
well as strengths of the technique. The founders made the "mistake"
of conducting studies on their subject and on their own performance
because, in contrast to the other forensic identification sciences, they
came from fields accustomed to conducting empirical research and
basing their conclusions on hard data: acoustical engineering, electrical
engineering, linguistics, physiology, experimental psychology. Data
always are messier than theoretical suppositions, and will always give
more pause. Ironically, then, it may be that any field that brings more
science with it will be viewed more skeptically. The other forensic
identification sciences may have done nothing better to help their
cause, at least in the eyes of courts, than to do little or no empirical re-
search.
Finally, the voiceprint cases also illustrate some things about the
relationship of admissibility doctrine and admissibility decisions. First.
they illustrate the malleability of the Frye test, by which judges can cast
their net as narrowly or widely as they choose in order to find the "par-
ticular field in which it belongs" and within which the technique at is-
sue must have been generally accepted and thereby admissible. As we
can see with these voiceprint cases, those courts that cast a wide net
almost always excluded the asserted expertise and those casting a nar-
row net admitted it. More generally, we see a correlation between the
rule applied and the result reached. This can give us confidence in the
268. See infra subsection III.E. concerning bite marks.
269. I have not examined the briefs filed with the courts to see if the attorneys cited the
NAS study.
270. What lesson is this? Lawyers and judges, apparently, do not research particularly
well the scientific materials bearing on their cases. How might a patient feel about being
operated upon by a surgeon who was unaware of the single most pivotal review of research
concerning the operation being performed? How would any client, or the larger society. feel
about their legal decisions being made by judges and lawyers who were unaware of the sin-
gle most pivotal study concerning the case being decided? Perhaps the courts that cited but
did not read (or read but did not comprehend) the NAS Report should be even more trou-
bling.
271. With the exception of DNA typing, which came later, and which similarly seems to
prove the "rule" suggested here.
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rule of law or not, depending upon whether the courts followed an es-
tablished rule to its inevitable consequence, or chose a rule to bring
about the result desired. Often, the applicable rule governing admissi-
bility of asserted scientific evidence has been vague and unclear, so that
courts have considerable wiggle room with which to select the rule to
use in any given case.'
E. Bite Marks: Exempt from Frye and Collins
The analysis of bite marks for the purpose of identifying a criminal
perpetrator is a specialized task within the broader discipline of foren-
sic odontology. Forensic dentists traditionally had been called upon to
identify the remains of disaster victims by comparing the victims' denti-
tion with dental records. 3 In trying to identify perpetrators of crime,
the forensic dentist seeks to compare a suspect's dentition with a latent
mark left in the victim's flesh or in some edible substance found at the
scene of a crime.V'
Bite mark identification is one of the newest areas of forensic
identification. The courts have been virtually unanimous in admitting
such testimony. Bite mark expert opinion has now been admitted in
most jurisdictions of the United States, the great majority of those oc-
curring since 1980.5
Several ironies accompany this legal history. One is that forensic
odontologists, perhaps reflecting a grounding in scientific skepticism
that is absent from the traditional forensic identification sciences, 6
were more doubtful about whether the state of their knowledge per-
mitted them to successfully accomplish the challenging task of identi-
fying a perpetrator "to the exclusion of all others." The history of
other areas of forensic identification reveals few with similar self-
doubts. Second, in spite of the existence of these profound doubts, the
courts began admitting expert testimony on bite marks even under the
272. See Bohan & Heels, supra note 38, at 1036, Table 2 (comparing variety of "tests"
adopted among and within states for determining admissibility of purported scientific evi-
dence).
273. See MOENSSENS ETAL., supra note 4, Chapter 16.
274. The two tasks differ in important ways. In the disaster situation, there is a finite
number of candidates to identify, and full dentition often or usually is available both from
the victims and the dental charts. In bite mark cases, the number of potential suspects is
huge, the bite marks include only a limited portion of the dentition, and flesh provides a far
less clear medium for recording a bite mark than having the teeth (of the disaster victim)
themselves.
275. For a compilation of these cases, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 15,
§ 24-1.0.
276. By traditional forensic sciences, I mean fingerprints, footprints, toolmarks, hand-
writing, firearms, and so on.
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Frye test.
And, third, rather than the field convincing the courts of the suffi-
ciency of its knowledge and skills, admission by the courts apparently
convinced the forensic odontology community that, despite their
doubts, they really were able to perform bite mark identifications."
The first case in the United States to confront the admissibility of
expert testimony on bite mark identification was in the Texas case of
Doyle v. State."' Doyle was charged with burglary. At the site of the
burglary was found a piece of partially eaten cheese. After arresting
Doyle, the sheriff asked him to bite a piece of cheese, which the sus-
pect voluntarily did. A firearms examiner then compared the two
pieces of cheese to try to determine if the questioned and the known
tooth marks had been made by the same person. The firearms exam-
iner concluded that they had. At trial a dentist testified that from his
own examination of plaster casts of the cheese bite marks, he also held
the opinion that one and the same dentition had made both sets of
bites.y 9 The court upheld the admission of this bite mark opinion tes-
timony8
Although the empirical research necessary to form the scientific
ground for such a conclusion had not yet been accomplished,8 ' the de-
fense in Doyle did not contest admissibility by raising any issue of sci-
entific validity, but instead raised only procedural challenges.' Be-
277. In their book on scientific evidence, MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 4, conclude the
following about the relationship between the courts and expert opinion on bite mark identi-
fication:
The wholesale acceptance, by the courts, of testimony on bite mark identifica-
tion has transformed the profession. Whereas prior to 1974 the main thrust of
forensic dentistry was to prove identity of persons by means of a comparison of
postmortem and antemortem dental records in mass disasters, the profession has
changed direction and is now heavily involved in assisting prosecutors in homi-
cides and sex offense cases. Having received judicial approval of bite mark
comparisons, there seems to be no more limit on the extent of forensic odon-
tological conclusions.
Id. at 985.
278. 263 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954). Although this was the first appellate con-
sideration of bite mark evidence, the technique had been used for related identification pur-
poses for decades. See MOENSSENS ETAL., supra note 4, § 16.04.
279. See Doyle, 263 S.W.2d at 779.
280. See id. at 780. The court did not consider the admissibility of the bite mark on evi-
dentiary grounds, but on self-incrimination grounds. See id. at 779.
281. See Raymond Rawson, Identification from Bite Marks, § 24-2.1.1[11, in MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faig-
man et al. eds., 1997) (The earliest relevant empirical research was conducted two decades
after Doyle was decided.).
282. See Doyle, 263 S.W.2d at 779-80. Instead, the defense raised only the issue of
whether obtaining the bitten cheese from the defendant constituted a confession and thereby
violated a Texas statute prohibiting obtaining confessions without warning defendants of
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cause the issue never arose, the Doyle opinion contained no holding on
the fundamental question of the scientific status of bite mark identifi-
cation. Nevertheless, another Texas court relied on Doyle twenty
years later as the basis for rejecting an appellant's contention that bite
mark test results were of unproven reliability.'
The cornerstone case on the admissibility of bite mark identifica-
tion was decided in 1975, in California. In People v. Marx,' the court
undertook to grapple with the real issues of admissibility raised by bite
mark identification, but succeeded only in avoiding them. Marx in-
volved the brutal murder of an elderly woman.' An elliptical lacera-
tion was discovered on the victim's nose.' This mark was judged to be
a human bite mark. Impressions were made of the wound for compari-
son with a cast of the defendant's teeth287
At trial, three odontologists testified that in their opinion the de-
fendant's dentition matched the bite wound.' One of those experts
took pains to note that in many other cases he had refused to offer a
firm opinion or even to testify about an identification. This case, how-
ever, was an exception in that the dentition at issue was unusual and
the bite mark was "exceptionally well defined." The witness charac-
terized these bite impressions as the clearest he had ever seen, either
personally or in published literature.' Despite the expert's caution,
and unusual case facts emphasizing the rarity of both the dentition and
the bite marks, once the courtroom door was pried open, Marx became
the admission ticket for a far wider and more dubious array of denti-
tion evidence in many subsequent cases.
On appeal, the defense challenged the admission of expert opin-
ions on bite wound identification on the ground that the purported
skills were not sufficiently established or generally accepted in the field
of forensic dentistry.' California law presented two major barriers to
admission. First, California followed the Frye test, so that the prosecu-
tion had to show that the field of dentistry or perhaps just forensic den-
tistry, generally accepted the theory and techniques of bite mark iden-
their likely use.
283. See Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857, 863 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). If the admis-
sion of the bite mark was in fact error, the court stated that it was harmless error given the
appellant's written confession that he had indeed bitten the victim.
284. 54 Cal. App. 3d 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
285. See id. at 351.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 352.
288. See id. at 353 n.5. For a detailed discussion of the scientific evidence in this case,
see Gerald L. Vale et al., Unusual Three-Dimensional Bite Mark Evidence in a Homicide
Case, 21 J. FORENSIC Sci. 642 (1976).
289. See Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 108 n.8 (statement of Dr. Vale).
290. See id at 353.
1121Apr. 1998]
tification.29' Second, the California Supreme Court had prohibited
speculative probability estimates from forming the basis of a criminal
conviction.9
The appeals court acknowledged that there was "no established
science of identifying persons from bite marks .... ,,293 Moreover, the
theory of bite mark identification, like all forensic identification sci-
ence, is based on estimations of the probability that two or more peo-
ple could leave the same bite mark. -94 If that probability is sufficiently
low, the forensic dentist will testify that the defendant's teeth are the
ones that left the crime scene marks. Yet no data existed on those
probabilities. The state of forensic odontology would, on the face of it,
seem to have left it unable to scale these legal barriers. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals reasoned its way over these hurdles and upheld
admission. Here is how:
The Court of Appeals deflected the implications of Frye, by inter-
preting that test in these terms:
The Frye test finds its rational basis in the degree to which the trier
of fact must accept, on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of
proof or disproof in court and not even generally accepted outside
the courtroom. Frye, for example, involved the lie detector test in
which the trier of fact is required to rely on the testimony of the
polygrapher, verified at most by marks on a graph, to which the ex-
pert's hypothesis gives some relevant meaning. [Other cases re-
flect] [t]he same concern that the trier of fact will be overwhelmed
by 'ill conceived techniques with which the trier of fact is not tech-
nically equipped to cope' sacrificing its independence in favor of
deference to the expert.
The court thus distinguished Marx from Frye by reasoning that
Frye applied only to evidence that was indecipherable without an ex-
pert's interpretation, whereas Marx involved models, photographs, X-
rays, and slides of the victim's wounds and the accused's dentition, all
of which were clearly visible for the jury to view, assess, and verify on
their own during court proceedings, without having to rely on the ex-
pert odontologist as a necessary intermediary. 96 Forensic odontolo-
gists, no doubt, would be surprised to learn that once the pictures are
taken and the models cast, no special expertise or judgment is required
to assess whether or not the wound was made by the defendant's denti-
tion or by someone else's.
291. See id. at 355-56.
292. See id. at 357 (citing People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 41 (Cal. 1968).
293. Id. at 353.
294. See Rawson, supra note 281, at § 24-2.1.1[1].
295. See Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 111 (quoting People v. Collins, 438 P.2d. 331, 41 (Cal.
1968)).
296. See id. at 356.
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Alternatively, the Marx court concluded that Frye's requirements
had been met because the methods used to facilitate the bite mark
identification were not really novel:
[T]he experts did not rely on untested methods, unproven hypothe-
ses, intuition or revelation. Rather, they applied scientifically and
professionally established techniques-X-rays, models, microscopy,
photography-to the solution of a particular problem which,
though novel, was well within the capability of those techniques.29
On this view, Frye is about tools, not the meaning of the informa-
tion collected with the help of the tools.98 By this analysis, even the
polygraph at issue in Frye in 1923 would have passed the Frye test.
While the reliability of the tools is by no means unimportant, that is
not the central question in bite mark identification. The most funda-
mental issues in bite mark identification, as with all forensic identifica-
tion, are (a) whether the population variation in the relevant charac-
teristics is immense (ideally, infinite, so that each dentition truly is
unique), (b) whether in practice that underlying variation is adequately
captured by the available tools and evidence, and (c) whether the la-
tent mark has enough distinct variation in it to allow the probability
that other dentition may have left the mark to fall comfortably low.2
None of this essential knowledge was, or usually is, available to the
jury. The question the court should be focusing on, however, is
whether it is available to the expert.'
Finally, the Marx court appears to have believed that evidence on
or even thoughts by the expert about the probabilities underlying bite
mark identifications would be inadmissible in California under the rule
of People v. Collins.3°' It held that, since the experts never had actual
data and did no calculations of probability, but instead remained im-
pressionistic and intuitive, "[n]one of the witnesses engaged in a 'trial
by mathematics' [citing Collins] on or off the witness stand. There was
no error."
''
297. lid. at 356 (footnotes omitted).
298. On this theory, of course, the polygraph in Frye would have been admissible, since
the physiological measures "applied [were] scientifically and professionally established tech-
niques." Id at 356. The central scientific issue in Frye was what one could infer from those
measures. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,1014 (D.C. Cir 1923).
299. See Rawson, supra note 281, nn. 14-17 and accompanying text.
300. If it is not, in some form or fashion, then the expert is speculating.
301. See Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 112,126 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (citing People v. Collins, 438
P.2d 33).
302. See id (quoting Collins, 438 P.2d at 41). Recall that earlier in the opinion, when
deflecting the Frye challenge, the court assured itself that "intuition or revelation" played no
part in bite mark identification. Id. at 356. Now, in deflecting a challenge based on Collins,
the court thought it had to assure itself of the opposite, that experts dealt with the probabilis-
tic underpinnings of bite mark opinions only through intuition and without any explicit statis-
tical calculations.
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First of all, the Marx court overstates the Collins prohibition. In
Collins, a statistically based identification was inadmissible because it
was based on (a) speculative probabilities (rather than known relative
frequencies of the attributes at issue),"3 (b) a lack of groof that the at-
tributes of interest consisted of independent events, and (c) invalid
conclusions of rarity inferred from the probability calculation, which
were su ggested to the jury as establishing proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. ° Absent these flaws, such evidence presumably would be ad-
missible. Second, whether a jury will be allowed to hear the numbers is
one thing. Whether they may be heard by a court in deciding a pre-
liminary question such as the admissibility of purported scientific evi-
dence is quite another. Any court following Federal Rule of Evidence
104 or an equivalent rule3 plainly is authorized to do soy and any
court following Daubert apparently has a positive duty to do so."
Most important, perhaps, Marx is one of the rare cases to realize
that much forensic identification evidence invokes the same reasoning
that the California Supreme Court found so troubling in Collins. To
believe that the experts, or the court in deciding a question of admissi-
bility of expert evidence, should eschew consideration of the underly-
ing data and the statistical inferences to be drawn from those data,
seems to stand Collins on its head. It does not solve any problem that
Collins was concerned with; it merely pretends the problems are not
there. The court is reading Collins as saying that the proper way for
experts and courts to think about the statistical aspects of a technique
is not to think about them, except in vague and cloudy terms. But the
existence and nature of probability data are at the heart of the theory
of forensic identification. Hiding one's eyes from precisely what needs
the closest examination is no solution.30 9
303. See Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
304. See id. at 39. In order to apply the multiplication rule to calculate the probability.
each component should be uncorrelated with the other components.
305. See id. at 40.
306. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 310,400-403 (West 1995).
307. See FED. R. EvID. 104. Moreover, in deciding such preliminary questions, the court
"is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." FED. R.
EVID. 104(a).
308. Among other data to be considered is a technique's "known or potential error
rate." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
309. DNA evidence is the best example of a field attempting to provide the necessary
data and probability calculations, and the chief exception to the pattern that evidence of-
fered by the forensic identification sciences resembles the evidence offered in Collins. The
Marx interpretation of Collins as prohibiting any explicit calculations of probability by ex-
perts would seem to exclude DNA typing because DNA experts collect, analyze, and explic-
itly rely on probability data. Notwithstanding the Marx court's reasoning, forensic odon-
tologists appreciate that these sorts of data are necessary, and are developing them. See
Rawson, supra note 281, § 24-2.1.1[1].
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The following year, in 1976, Illinois had its first occasion to con-
sider the admissibility of bite mark evidence. In People v. Milone, the
Court of Appeals held it admissible as "a logical extension of the ac-
cepted principle that each person's dentition is unique., 310 The court
based this on its earlier practice of using dental records and dentition
to identify deceased persons.' In Milone expert witnesses disagreed
sharply on the question of the validity and utility of bite mark identifi-
cations. The testimony of three forensic dentists was offered by the
prosecution and four by the defense.31 1 The defense experts testified
and cited odontological literature showing, at the least, considerable
disagreement among forensic odontologists as to whether offenders
could be uniquely identified from bites left in the flesh of victims.
313
Notwithstanding the controversy, in the trial record and in the litera-
ture, the court still managed to find that the general acceptance stan-
dard had been met.34 As virtually always happened, and contrary to
the approach of Daubert, the Milone court held that questions about
the truth of the proposition quoted above--of infinite variation and
unique identifiability-went to the weight of the expert testimony, not
to its admissibility.3"
By 1978, a California Court of Appeals flatly held that the testi-
mony of three forensic odontologists established that bite mark identi-
fication had gained the required general acceptance in the relevant sci-
entific community.
311
After the 1970's, there was no longer any debate in the courts-if
ever there had been-about the admissibility of bite mark expert
opinions to identify perpetrators of crime. Every subsequent appellate
case concerning the issue has held bite mark identification testimony to
be admissible. The rationale for admission in all of these cases has
followed one of two general approaches. Some courts have followed
the Marx precedent in holding that bite mark identification is generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community.317 Others simply
310. 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). This is another illustration of Quetelet's
hypothesis becoming accepted as a law of nature by the courts. See supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
311. See Milone, 356 N.E.2d at 1358 (citing People v. Maddox, 237 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1968)).
312. See Milone, 356 N.E.2d at 1355-56.
313. See id.
314. See id at 1360. Incidentally, as a testament to the power of weak or inapt prece-
dents, the court cited the Texas cases of Doyle (which had no data) and Patterson (which re-
lied on Doyle), as well as California's Marx (which dealt with unusual dentition, in contrast
to the apparently more common dentition of the present case). See id at 1359.
315. See id at 1360.
316. See People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611,625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
317. See, e.g., Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743,752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (per curiam).
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held that whether to admit such expert opinion lies within the discre-
tion of the trial court.3 8
Perhaps the most unusual legal development in these cases has
been a recent appeal by the defendant convicted in People v. Milone.3"9
Paroled after serving nearly twenty years in prison for murder, Milone
continues to insist upon his innocence and is seeking legal redress to
clear his name. In federal court, under both the Frye and Daubert
standards, he has challenged the original decision to admit the expert
bite mark testimony.32 ° Another murder victim was later found in the
same area where the victim in the Milone case had been found. A po-
tential bite mark from the second murder victim was linked to one
Macek. The marks in the two cases were judged by at least one foren-
sic odontologist to be indistinguishable from each other.3 21  Macek
signed a confession to having killed the victim in the Milone case, a
confession that later was withdrawn.3 22 For present purposes, more im-
portant than the question of whether or not Macek killed both victims,
is the suggestion that the relevant portions of dentition of two different
suspects were indistinguishably alike.323
Although the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit expressed sym-
pathy with the accused's request, in light of the new evidence pre-
sented, it declined to rule on the case for lack of a constitutional basis
for granting relief, and because principles of federalism precluded a
federal court from re-examining an issue of fact that is reserved to the
states.
32 4
The bite mark cases suggest that the quality of a field's science can
have less impact on the courts' decisions about the field than the
courts' decisions about the field have on the field's beliefs about itself.
318. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State, 640 P.2d 971, 978 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). Therefore,
the trial court's admissibility determination is subject only to deferential review by appellate
courts. On this view, of course, forensic odontology can be admitted as an exemplary sci-
ence in one trial courtroom one day and excluded as charlatanry in the courtroom next door
the following day.
319. See supra notes 310-315 and accompanying text.
320. See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1994).
321. The forensic odontologist, later President of the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences, had been a defense expert in Milone and wrote about these cases in Lowell Levine,
Forensic Dentistry: Our Most Controversial Case, in LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 1978 73
(Cyril H. Wecht ed., 1979).
322. See discussion in Missouri v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 571-72 (1980).
323. See Levine, supra note 321, at 77. Such findings are not unique in the identification
sciences-notably document examination and bertillonage. In the present case, however, it
might be noted that the comparison was not made using standard methods or procedures
because of Macek's having undergone extraction of his teeth. The comparisons of the bite
marks to x-rays of pre-extracted teeth hold little similarity to standard comparison proce-
dures of overlaying biting edges onto the injury patterns on the skin.
324. See Milone, 22 F.3d. at 705.
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As a field, forensic dentists appreciated the magnitude of the challenge
of unique identification better than most identification scientists before
them, and the need for, but lack of, data supporting the opinions they
would like to have been able to offer, and therefore came to court with
admirable self-doubt. But pivotal opinions like Marx and Milone
swept aside those doubts.3' The courts in these pivotal opinions also
did not find admissibility doctrine to present much of a barrier. Patent
disagreement within the field about their capability to individualize did
not prevent courts from finding general acceptance.
Furthermore, the California appeals court that decided Marx
managed to find a knothole in the fence that People v. Collins erected
against probabilistic evidence that lacked a real database and relied
upon erroneous and misleading interpretations of probability.3'
That court seemed to sense how serious a threat Collins posed, not
only to bite marks but to most of forensic identification science.3  Per-
haps the Marx court is correct in applying Collins only to explicit prob-
ability calculation-that is, it is permissible if the expert intuits the
probabilities and tells the jury only the conclusion they lead to. On the
other hand, if Collins is still good law in California, it remains to be ex-
plained how any forensic identification science, other than DNA typ-
ing, can be admitted into evidence in California courts. That is, unless
and until forensic scientists develop the empirical data needed to re-
place probabilistic guestimations with data.32
Conclusion
A great deal of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the
need for illusion is deep.
What lessons might be drawn about the law's regulation of pur-
325. If the courts think we are good enough, then "by golly" we must be. Although
there are now many forensic dentists who will testify, there also are many who continue to
see important weaknesses in the theoretical and empirical foundations of their central
claims, and continue to do research to try to fill those gaps and improve the quality of the
work they do. See Rawson, supra note 281. See also MANUAL OFFORENSIC ODONTOLOGY
(C. Michael Bowers & Gary L. Bell eds., 1995).
326. Erroneous in that the statistical model did not take into account whether or not the
features of interest were independent, which has a large impact on the probability arrived at,
whether explicitly or intuitively.
327. Misleading in that the jury is not helped to appreciate how diagnostic the probabil-
istic conclusions are (or aren't).
328. DNA typing is the exception because, in its collection and analysis of explicit data,
DNA typing adheres to Collins's requirements.
329. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 57, at 372.
330. Saul Bellow, quoted in PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OuR TIME 428 (Laur-
ence J. Peter ed., 1977).
Apr. 1998] MERLIN AND SOLOMON
ported scientific evidence from our review of the major formative en-
counters of the courts with the forensic identification sciences? The
most obvious lesson is that this area of law is riddled with contradic-
tion, confusion and chaos. Here is an area of law typified by unin-
formed acceptance or rejection (usually the former) of empirical claims
that courts rarely made any effort to try to understand; by judicial
opinions that failed to explain the courts' reasoning about the asserted
expertise; by evasion or manipulation of the governing legal tests, or
the use of no legal test at all; and by abdication of the intellectual and
institutional duty to decide, in deference to the "authority" of the very
witnesses whose offerings were to be evaluated.
The most ironic of these contradictions is that such a performance
would occur in relation to scientific evidence. Science should not be
mysterious. Indeed, science evolved as a means of taking the mystery
out of our understandings of the way the world works. The scientific
method is essentially a set of logical procedures for testing the validity
of empirical claims.33' Science is a system for making explicit the as-
sumptions underlying beliefs and making plain the evidence and infer-
ences on which conclusions stand (or fall).332 Real science is not an al-
ternative mysticism.
How can this potentially most lucid of evidence have been treated
as if it were merely so much magic-impenetrable, calling for acts of
faith rather than reason? How can what might have been expected to
be the most helpful and most manageable kind of evidence have given
rise to some of the most vacuous and opaque judicial opinions? Let's
see if we can draw some lessons from this experience that help make
sense of it.
A. The Foreground Can Hide the Background
The most prominent issue in discussions of the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence has been the choice of a rule. A well conceived and
well drafted rule of evidence or procedure, it is assumed, should enable
courts to admit valid while excluding invalid scientific evidence. If so,
it would follow that the difficulties and controversies over the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence during the past century are simply an indi-
331. This is true at the level of facts as well as at the level of theories, because theories in
science are theories about empirical phenomena. All questions that science aims to deal
with are empirical, because the only questions science is peculiarly competent to deal with
are empirical.
332. For an extended discussion of the scientific method for lawyers and judges, see gen-
erally Michael J. Saks, Scientific Method: The Logic of Drawing Inferences from Empirical
Evidence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
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cation that rule makers have not yet hit upon the right test.
This perspective places emphasis on the truth-seeking function of
trials. Valid scientific knowledge ought to help resolve factual uncer-
tainties. If the courts, exercising their gatekeeping responsibility, can
separate the valid from the invalid science, then factfinders should gain
very real help.
From this viewpoint, the shifts from the implicit marketplace test
to Frye and from Frye to Daubert are significant ones because they are
experiments with different ways of answering the question: Which as-
serted knowledge is valid? Under the marketplace test, judges asked
whether consumers of an asserted expertise found it useful in impor-
tant everyday affairs of life outside the courtroom. Under Frye, judges
asked whether the community of experts believed themselves to be in
possession of valid and useful knowledge. Under Daubert, judges ask
whether the asserted scientific expertise can be seen to be valid, based
on its underlying empirical support. By definition, the tests before
Daubert did not have judges evaluating science, but evaluating instead
what the consumers or producers of an asserted science thought of it.
The shift to Daubert clearly is a shift toward evaluating science more in
the manner that scientists evaluate purported science, and therefore
represents an increased emphasis on the truth-finding value of trials.
But these rules may conceal more than they reveal about scientific
evidence admissibility decisions. Many of the judicial opinions we ex-
amined seemed to use no rule at all. Others would pick and choose the
test or its variant to be applied, or manipulate the rule they felt obli-
gated to use, or claimed to be using.333 In short, it seems apparent that
in making admissibility decisions, courts were guided by considerations
that went beyond any "admissibility test," and that could easily over-
ride any admissibility test.
What then, in addition to rule-guided tests of admissibility, might
be driving the admissibility decisions?
The very promise of scientific evidence-that it can command-
ingly resolve vital and troubling factual uncertainties, such as the iden-
tity of the perpetrator of a crime-heightens two competing fears that
judicial gatekeepers must harbor. One is the fear of permitting rubbish
to infect a trial, mislead a jury, and lead to the wrongful conviction of
an innocent person. Counterposing that is the fear of overlooking evi-
dence that would forcefully reveal the guilt of a true perpetrator of a
serious crime. Thus, the central dilemma of trials, namely, the coun-
tervailing fears of convicting the innocent or acquitting the guilty, are
reduced to an evidentiary decision. The admissibility decision is in-
fused with much of the anxiety that the scientific evidence proposes to
333. See also infra subsection C.
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obviate. Moreover, the court can resolve this gatekeeping dilemma
only if it surmounts new and more challenging intellectual hurdles.
In many or most of the pivotal cases involving forensic identifica-
tion science, the courts responded to these fears and challenges mostly
by avoiding the necessity of making a real decision about the asserted
science. This was accomplished in a variety of ways, such as by resting
the decision on collateral legal grounds,334 or by passing the decision on
to the jury,335 or by trusting the experts to do the court's gatekeeping
for it.
331
These strategies usually, or necessarily, result in admission of the
evidence. The trial goal served by such strategies has elsewhere been
referred to as an "exorcism of ignorance. "3 ' That is, whether valid sci-
ence or not, the scientific expert's testimony will help the fact finder
escape from the quandary of deciding whether a defendant is indeed
the perpetrator. Evidence advances that goal, more evidence is pre-
sumed to be better than less evidence, and if it points strongly in one
direction, the fact finder can make a far less conflicted decision and
feel better about it.
Scientific evidence admissibility decisions also are opportunities to
win, or retain, public confidence in the decisions of courts. The mar-
ketplace test was best adapted to this purpose. If the public, in the
marketplace, came to believe in the value of a given expertise, then a
court could enlist that confidence for use in its own decisions by adding
the same expertise to the ingredients of its trials. Frye was the second
best method of doing this. But in an era of specialization, perhaps
courts could do no better in strengthening public confidence in the in-
put to and outcome of trials than by piggy-backing their own admissi-
bility decisions onto the beliefs of respected professional communi-
ties.
334. For example, where a sample is sought from a defendant, by focusing on the issue
of self-incrimination, and being content to resolve that issue.
335. One of the most familiar of judicial avoidance strategies is acting as though there
really is no gatekeeping issue, but only issues of credibility or weight which are to be decided
by the jury.
336. In most instances, the expert's assertion of valid expertise was sufficient to gain
admissibility. Moreover, the Frye test formalizes faith in experts. And though the Frye test
has the wisdom of asking judges to assess the consensus among the community of experts, in
practice that is rarely done, and the court ends up relying on the "say-so" of the expert(s)
before the court.
337. See Risinger et al., supra note 99, at 782.
338. That astrology would pass at least the narrow Frye test, and yet would never be
admitted as expert evidence, is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. That is to say, the
courts reveal themselves to have a finger on the pulse of the general or elite publics in order
to know that they would invite ridicule by admitting expert astrological testimony, merely
because those techniques were "generally accepted" among astrologers. They would not
follow the Frye rule to the logical conclusion to admit astrology because to do so would not
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Of course, scientific truth and what the public has faith in often
will be one and the same thing. But where they differ, courts face the
dilemma of either admitting untruths that are nevertheless widely sub-
scribed to (thereby impeding the search for truth but enhancing the
public's confidence in the courts) or excluding them (thereby advanc-
ing the search for truth but reducing the public's confidence in the
courts). From this perspective, Daubert is a bold and risky departure
from tradition. In its theory, at least, Daubert's approach places so
high a value on truth-seeking that it is willing to risk the episodic (and
perhaps cumulative) loss of public confidence.339 On the other hand, by
dedicating itself to filtering out any and all empirical claims that cannot
be demonstrated to be valid, perhaps public confidence in the trial pro-
cess will be enhanced in the long run.
Finally, in a world of continually advancing scientific knowledge
and technological innovations, the courts are in essence presented with
the choice of keeping pace or being dismissed as obsolete Luddites.
Every time a new, asserted, and at least plausible scientific expertise
presented itself, especially in the service of convicting criminal defen-
dants, courts cast their lot with modernity. And we have seen courts
giving themselves large pats on the back for doing exactly this, while
displaying no more scientific acumen than the most superstitious sha-
man.
B. The Law Can Affect the Growth of Science
The choice of admissibility rules and associated procedures may
also have the purpose of influencing the nature or direction of the de-
velopment of science. The courts can create incentives to do more and
better research, or disincentives for doing so.
Fundamental new discoveries risk raising judicial doubts about all
that had gone before, and what the future may reveal about the pres-
ent. No advances means raising fewer doubts. We have seen examples
of forensic identification sciences-fingerprints, handwriting, tool
marks-that have been largely frozen in time, with little if any funda-
mental progress since their foundational appearances in court. ° This
advance this arguable goal of the Frye test, to garner public confidence.
339. For example, if the public believes in the scientific and professional claims of hand-
writing experts, but the courts exclude it, the public will ask why the courts bury their heads
in the sand, and refuse to accept the benefits that asserted expertise has to offer. In this
light, Starzecpyzel is an ingenious opinion: It serves the scientific truth-seeking values of
Daubert by declaring that handwriting expertise is not based on science, while still soliciting
public support by recognizing that the public believes it will be helpful.
340. By fundamental I mean the basic scientific understanding these fields have of the
phenomena with which they deal. I do not mean advances in mere technique; for example,
new techniques for making latent prints visible or for photographing writings.
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freezing resulted from a combination of premature (or at least science-
free) judicial acceptance, the lack of other institutions (such as industry
or academia) where competition or critical evaluation might create in-
centives for improved knowledge as well as improved technique. It is
interesting to wonder what effect the competition of the adversary pro-
cess might have had, if the opponents of admission had had the re-
sources to mount challenges with the help of equal and opposing ex-
perts, challenges which the proponent's experts would then have had to
meet.
The response of the courts also can inflate a field's views of its
own capabilities. Recall, in the instance of bite mark identification, the
courts did more to convince the experts that their knowledge was up to
the task of pinpoint identification than forensic odontologists did to
convince the courts. Such encouragement can slow progress at the
same time that it enlarges a field's belief in itself. Recall the observa-
tion that "[t]he wholesale acceptance, by the courts, of testimony on
bite mark identification has transformed the profession.... Having re-
ceived judicial approval of bite mark comparisons, there seems to be
no more limit on the extent of forensic odontological conclusions."-"
There is no reason to think that the courts could not have a more
productive effect on the growth of knowledge.- 2 The Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert prompted forensic scientists to begin to re-examine
the supportability of their fields' claims.343 Starzecpyzel, in particular,
led directly to invitations from handwriting experts to some of their
critics to meet and discuss both what is deficient in the underlying sup-
port for the claims of handwriting identification expertise and what re-
search might be undertaken to begin, at long last, to install a scientific
foundation under their work.3"
Explicit efforts by the law to promote improved quality of forensic
science have been suggested in the form of regulation 5 or new organ-
izational arrangements. 34 6 It may well be that admissibility decisions of
341. MOENSSENS AT AL., supra note 4, § 16.07, at 985.
342. For an example of such impact outside of forensic science, see Joseph Sanders, The
Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301
(1992) (the life cycle of mass toxic tort litigation includes the growth of research on the ef-
fects of the suspected toxin following early litigation asserting a causal connection between
the chemical and the plaintiff's injuries).
343. The 1996 annual meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences had three
major sessions in several different areas of forensic identification devoted to the challenges
posed by Daubert. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AAFS, 1996, NASHVILLE, TN (see, e.g., ses-
sions El, E2, and E3).
344. See id.
345. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 109 (1991).
346. See Giannelli, supra note 104.
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courts are instruments too blunt to guide the development of scientific
fields. Moreover, their very bluntness apparently can produce too little
or the wrong kind of research by a field, at least fields that are oriented
almost exclusively toward the courts and have the benefit of no other,
more constructive, institutional pressures? 7
C. Sometimes the Law has no Effect on the Law
The experience in this area of law reveals a number of important
cases where the law failed to have the expected impact on itself. This is
worth documenting in its own right. But we also can ask whether the
evasion illuminates some purpose behind the rule which is (or is not)
present.
(1) Frye can be Evaded
On the same day that he published Frye, Judge Van Orsdel ig-
nored his own test in another scientific evidence case of first impres-
sion. It should be no wonder then, that other judges found ways to
evade the test, even though the law of their jurisdiction required them
to use it, such as in Marx, the cornerstone case of forensic odontology.
The voice spectrography cases provide an excellent illustration of the
manipulability of the Frye test: To set the stage so that the proffered
science is admitted, define the "particular field in which it belongs"
narrowly, consisting of those who practice and promote the asserted
science or technology. To set the stage for exclusion, define the field
broadly, including those allied fields with more rigorous standards than
those of the technique's practitioners.'
(2) Daubert can be Evaded
Daubert might have been thought to exclude handwriting identifi-
cation by forensic document examiners on a court's finding that no
data supported the proponents' claims of expertise, along with data
that raised severe doubts about examiners' assumptions and abilities.
Such findings by a court would seem to be the opposite of establishing
evidentiary reliability. But the Starzecpyzel court, as well as several
347. For example, limits exist as to what engineers or physicians or psychiatrists can say
in court because they have academic and commercial constituencies to whom they must an-
swer. Their academic and scientific peers demand accuracy and their commercial clients
demand progress. And discrepancies between what is asserted in court and what has been
learned due to the expectations of those other constituencies cannot grow too large. Noth-
ing comparable exists for the forensic identification sciences.
348. This is a flaw in the Frye test well recognized in the legal commentary on the sub-
ject. See Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
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others that followed in its wake, re-classified that offering as non-
science, thereby freeing themselves to apply a different and far more
porous test of admissibility. Ironically, as a result of Starzecpyzel and
its progeny, it can be said that courts had once admitted handwriting
identification expertise because they believed it was scientifically well-
founded and well-tested, while now they admit it because they know it
is scientifically unfounded and untested.
(3) Fundamental Principles can be Evaded
If nothing else, one might have thought that inherent in the act of
making a ruling is the requirement of writing a judicial opinion in
which the court explains its reasoning. Indeed, the legitimacy of judi-
cial authority depends, at a minimum, upon giving reasons for the deci-
sions.349 Absent reasons, the law is rendered arbitrary and courts sur-
render their authority. Yet in the cases we have examined, judges are
often at a loss to explain their reasons, perhaps because they have so
little understanding of the scientific evidence on which they are ruling
that they do not even pretend to explain their reasoning in their opin-
ions .3 An especially clear example is provided by the two founda-
tional tool mark cases of the Supreme Court of Washington State. The
second of these opinions reversed the holding of the first, affirmed six
months earlier, in cases involving the same expertise and the same ex-
pert. With respect to the asserted science of tool mark identification,
the court did not explain the change in its understanding that led to its
reversal of position. Nor did it explain the defects it believed it saw in
the asserted science that led, only months before, to rejecting tool
mark identification expertise.35" '
These cases, in numerous different areas of forensic identification
science and in diverse ways, suggest a tension between the goals of the
judges and the goals of the admissibility rules. Or perhaps the rules are
constructed to be flexible so as to allow more intuitive, more popular,
expertise-by-expertise decisions to be made. What seems clear from
these cases is that no rule is capable of preventing admission when a
judge is inclined to admit; each rule permits the court ample room to
squeeze testimony through the filter.
349. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
167-71 (1985); KARLN. LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
26 (1960).
350. Perhaps because what they have experienced is intuition and emotions, or at least
trust, but no mature reasoning.
351. See supra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
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D. Courts Mistake Controversy for Error and Consensus for Validity
In many of the cases we have reviewed, the courts were presented
with only one-sided questions regarding the adequacy of a given kind
of asserted scientific evidence. Prosecutors typically offered the novel
forensic science and defendants typically offered no reply of substance.
The courts in these cases often said they were impressed at the "uncon-
tradicted" expert testimony.
The adversary process is founded on the assumption that the truth
of contestable propositions is most likely to emerge from structured
disagreement. This fundamental belief seems to be forgotten as soon
as courts try to evaluate science. Courts seem to expect other fields to
resolve their uncertainties and reach a conclusion without disputes and
without conflicting information. More than that, courts seem to expect
of science what no earthly discipline can deliver, namely, something
approaching certainty."2 And more than that, courts appear to inter-
pret the absence of controversy as the principal indication that infalli-
ble truth has been achieved. In part because Daubert requires, or at
least invites, a more adversarial inquiry into the substance of science,
judges are about to discover a world of science that is far less infallible
than their past approaches allowed them to regard it as being.353
Rather than viewing vigorous debate within a scientific field as a
healthy sign that uncertainties are being addressed, the courts seem to
mistake debate for the presence of error. By contrast, would Anglo-
American judges have more confidence in the findings of fact that
emerged from a trial in which only one side was presented and the fact
finder reached an unconflicted decision based on a one-sided hearing?
Or more confidence in the findings of a trial in which decision-making
was informed by contrasting evidence and vigorous debate?
Lack of controversy in science may well signal that a proposition
of importance to the particular field has been thoroughly tested and
settled. But it may also signal the absence of vigorous inquiry, an im-
poverished research tradition, lack of resources, or stagnation. Moreo-
ver, in criminal courts, the absence of countervailing experts probably
reflects simply the lack of the resources necessary to support an adver-
sarial contest. On the civil side, corporate titans rarely are at a loss to
352. See Imwinkelried, supra note 153. But rather than holding scientific evidence to
impossibly high standards and excluding it, courts usually admit it, and in so doing tend to
attribute to it higher levels of accomplishment than it has achieved. Not: We admit the evi-
dence because it is excellent. But rather: Since we are going to admit it it must be excellent.
353. See id. Also consider the incident of the judge who had berated a physician for tes-
tifying in court about the field's belief about signs of injury, which the physician now was ex-
plaining to this meeting of judges was no longer considered valid by her field. See note 111,
supra. On the general subject of the law's ability to deconstruct science, see Sheila Jasanoff,
What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRIcS J. 345 (1992).
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contest any and every issue, scientific or otherwise.
Adversarial disagreement can be the means for challenging junk
science and alerting a court to it. Silence, lack of disagreement, might
not signal truth or even informed consensus. The structural absence of
controversy is no assurance that truth has been found.
E. Judges Do Not Think Like Scientists
Just as legal training teaches one the intellectual skills to analyze
legal problems, scientific training teaches one how to analyze empirical
questions and proposed answers. This places judges in a weak position
to know what questions need to be asked in order to test an empirical
claim or how to evaluate the data offered in answer."' Daubert re-
quires judges to think like scientists. Some of the cases we have re-
viewed offer a preview of the struggles that judges must face as they
undertake this challenge for which they are untrained.
The foundational opinions evaluating fingerprints, tool marks, and
the earlier handwriting cases show no serious, substantive discussion of
the phenomenon at issue in the claimed expertise."' Sometimes those
courts were silent on the assertedly scientific substance. Sometimes
they were content merely to cite to publications in which someone else
had endorsed the discipline, even if those endorsements contained lit-
tle or no empirical evidence or analysis. Frequently, courts were satis-
fied that the proffered expert witness testified that the asserted science
was valid or that the witness's views were generally accepted in the
field, or both. But rarely, if ever, did they rely on substantive evalua-
tions of theory and data.
These judges were, of course, doing nothing other than behaving
like the lawyers they were trained to be. There is no reason to expect
courts to display any aptitude for evaluating the quality of scientific
evidence. Their personnel-judges and lawyers-have been prepared
for a field on the other side of the canyon that separates science from
the humanities. By training, they barely know where to begin thinking
354. I once asked a class of judges I was teaching to imagine that they were surgeons
who wanted to resolve the field's disagreement about which of two alternative surgical pro-
cedures was better. How would they approach solving that problem? They sat in pained
silence. One judge finally suggested that they should ask an expert. I reminded them that in
this exercise they were the experts. How did they think experts find answers? Does God
whisper the answers into their ears?
355. In recent handwriting identification cases, the courts recognized that forensic
document examiners failed the Daubert test, and so they excused them from having to pass
it, imagining that they somehow acquired a practical skill from spending years looking at
writings. These courts apparently did not realize that the hypothesis of practical skill is itself
an empirical claim, which can be tested, and can only be tested, with relevant empirical data,
not with analogies.
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about the problem before them. And the tools courts are provided
with-the available rules and procedures-are not up to the task."6
But let us concede that the structure of our legal system requires
generalist judges guided by generalist lawyers to make these decisions
about the admissibility of scientific evidence." That has to be the
starting point from which the law tries to construct a system that can
help courts do this job better.
F. Lawyers and Judges can Manage to Overlook Even the Best and Most
Accessible Knowledge in an Unfamiliar Field
We have only one major "test" of this proposition, but its results
can only frighten anyone who realizes what it suggests-a failure of the
adversary process to do precisely what is claimed to be one of its prin-
cipal virtues.
The National Academy of Sciences was asked by the FBI to
evaluate voice spectrography used for the purpose of identifying sus-
pects, and the Academy assembled a diverse and first-rate panel of ex-
perts to examine the scientific evidence on the question. The Academy
published a detailed report of their conclusions, which the FBI
promptly adverted to. Lawyers in trials around the country failed to
find and bring the report to the attention of judges, judges failed to find
the report, and several courts which clearly knew of the report failed to
learn from it.58
In short, the adversary process failed to motivate lawyers to find
and offer the most important evidence on the subject at issue. And, al-
though judges making a ruling on admissibility as a matter of law359
have a duty to find the necessary evidence themselves, the courts failed
to do so in almost every case following the publication of this report."
An approximate equivalent of this would be if lawyers and judges
all managed to overlook, or to read and disregard, a controlling Su-
preme Court opinion on a point central to a case at hand. It may hap-
pen occasionally. But ten times out of eleven?
That scientific literature is less accessible to lawyers and judges
than cases or statutes may be the explanation, but cannot be a justifica-
tion.
356. It would never occur to anyone to ask scientists, without law training, to write judi-
cial opinions. And if they were asked, we would not be surprised to find them missing the
obvious, making major mistakes, and generally mucking up the job.
357. Unless legislatures decide categories of it for them, requiring the wholesale admis-
sion or exclusion of various types of asserted expertise. This, of course, offers no guarantee
of scientific validity, only democratic acceptability.
358. They probably failed to read it.
359. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 51, at 497.
360. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
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G. Bad Science Makes Bad Law
Some fields are bubbling cauldrons of inquiry. No assumption
passes unexamined. No claim goes untested. No test goes unrepli-
cated. Members of the field are bred on skepticism. Nothing becomes
a shrine in the temple of that field's knowledge unless and until it has
passed the most demanding scrutiny. Other fields are far less rigor-
361
ous.
This contrast suggests one of the more subtle defects in the Frye
test: General acceptance will be attained in less scientifically vigorous
fields more readily than in more demanding fields. As a result, the
courts will welcome the more dubious from weaker fields of science
sooner than the more reliable from stronger fields. By contrast, under
a Daubert type analysis, fields that engage in less vigorous and less rig-
orous research will offer the courts less research to examine, and the
research that is offered will be of lower quality. In short, "scientific"
fields without a strong scientific research tradition will make it harder
for the courts to evaluate their offerings.62 Courts forced to make de-
cisions about the admissibility of science based on a small body of
poorly designed studies (or no studies at all) are going to have a much
harder time making good decisions.
H. The Two Most Prominent Rules of Admissibility are Simply Markers of
the Options
The principal admissibility rules-Frye and Daubert-are not so
much alternative solutions to the challenge of legal gatekeeping of
purported scientific evidence as they are the markers of the two ex-
treme possibilities. Frye requires massive deference to extra-judicial
authorities and Daubert requires massive do-it-yourself. Frye does not
work because its measure of validity is the judgment of "the field," and
the field may consist of nonsense. For example, the Frye doctrine can-
not exclude astrology. Frye could work, but only if the fields whose
wares were offered to courts were limited to those that were valid and
vigorous scientific enterprises. Then the courts could have some confi-
361. For example, consider the following statement concerning a purported finding that
artificial chemicals in the environment mimic human hormones and are causing harmful
health effects: "But several leading scientists view such propositions as premature at best.
[The asserted conclusion is] fueled more by hyperbole than facts.... [Mlany of the claims...
when examined, turn out to be a house of cards." "These scientists say they are not arbitrar-
ily dismissing [the claims, but] there is a difference between a hypothesis and evidence."
Gina Kolata, Chemicals that Mimic Hormones Spark Alarm and Debate, N.Y. TIMES. Mar.
19, 1996, at B5. Instant internal challenges of this sort are common in many fields, but are
rare in the history of the forensic identification sciences.
362. See, e.g., Starzecpyzel, supra note 44.
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dence that a consensus reached in those fields derived from the bene-
fits we expect the methods and culture of science to produce. But that
initial determination is essentially the same unsolved problem moved
to a different stage in the decision process.
Daubert avoids the problems of Frye by making courts evaluate
science in much the way that science evaluates science. But the evalu-
ators are still lay judges. And judges are lawyers. And lawyers were
smart kids who disliked math and science. So they went to law school.
Can we really expect judges to serve as Solomons of manifold fields
that they may never have heard of until the day an issue, perhaps an-
swered by one of those fields, arrives in their court? 63
But perhaps the purpose of the rules is simply to hold up a target
to the courts; call one the Frye target and the other the Daubert target.
The Frye ideal says: do whatever the experts tell you to do. The Dau-
bert ideal says: figure out the science yourself. No court really is ex-
pected to or desired to be as deferential as Frye would seem to require
or as all-knowing as Daubert would seem to require. Courts are ex-
pected, instead, to make a reasonable, even if intuitive and unarticula-
ble decision, that is a nearer or more distant approximation of the tar-
get adopted by its jurisdiction. But courts of both jurisdictional types
are, realistically, expected to fall somewhere between the two targets,
and never actually to hit either extreme.
The search for workable and effective legal tests of scientific evi-
dence will have to continue. Perhaps effective solutions are more
likely to be found in systems of procedure than in rules of admissibil-
ity,3 perhaps even to the point of developing new institutions or fo-
rums within or alongside of the existing courts.65 Whether the courts'
management of the science that comes knocking on their door will ever
improve is a question that only the future can answer. In the mean-
time, society can ask of its judges the same question that Earl Weaver
asked of the umpires in his field: "Are you gonna get any better, or is
this it?
'31
363. Justice Blackmun says yes. Chief Justice Rehnquist says no. I point to the cases
cited throughout this article as one source of intelligence about how judges perform at these
tasks. If these cases provide any foresight on the question, many judges will do what they
can to make the task easy on themselves.
364. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 1113, for suggested so-
lutions.
365. See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 7 JuRIMETRICS J. 332
(1977).
366. Quoted by George Will, LBJ Administration Redux, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
May 17, 1993, at 15A.
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Appendix: Scientific Voice Identification Cases
S ldings, Legal Tests, and Citations to NAS Report
Jurisdic- Court Case Cite Date Legal Test* Held NAS
tion I Report
Military APP Wright 17 CMA 183 1967 Reliability IN
CA APP King 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 1968 Frye-broad OUT
NJ TR Cary 239 A.2d 680 1970 Frye-broad OUT
MN SC Trimble 192 N.W.2d 432 1971 none IN
FL APP Worley 263 So.2d 613 1972 Reliability IN
FL APP Alea 265 So.2d 96 1972 none + [Re- IN
liability]
CA APP Hodo 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 1973 Frye-narrow IN
US-DC APP Addison 498 F.2d 741 1974 Frye-broad OUT
Cir.
CA APP Law 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 1974 Frye-broad OUT
US-EDPA TR Sample 378 F. Supp. 44 1974 McC IN
MA SC Lykus 327 N.E.2d 671 1975 Frye-narrow IN
US-4"h Cir. APP Bailer 519 F.2d 463 1975 McC IN
US-6" Cir. APP Franks 511 F.2d 25 1975 McC + Re- IN
liability
US-6h Cir. APP Jenkins 525 F.2d 819 1975 McC + [Re- IN
liability]
OH APP Older- 44 Ohio App.2d 130 1975 Reliability IN
man
CA SC Kelly 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 1976 Frye-broad OUT
US-DC APP McDaniel 538 F.2d 408 1976 Frye-broad OUT
Cir. II
NY TR Rogers 385 N.Y.S.2d 228 1976 McC + Rel IN
+ [Frye]
PA SC Topa 369 A.2d 1277 1977 Frye-broad OUT
MI SC Tobey 257 N.W.2d 537 1977 Frye-broad OUT
US-SDNY TR Williams 443 F. Supp. 269 1977 Reliab + IN
[Frye-
broad]
MD SC Reed 391 A.2d 364 1978 Frye-broad OUT
US-2 Cir. APP Williams 583 F.2d 1194 1978 McC IN
NJ TR D'Arc 385 A.2d 278 1978 Reliab or OUT
- Frye-broad
DC APP Brown 384 A.2d 647 1978 [Reliability neither
+ Frye]
NY TR Collins 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 1978 Reliab + OUT
Frye-broad
ME SC Williams 388 A.2d 500 1978 Reliability- IN
S Relevancy
NY TR Bein 453 N.Y.S.2d 343 1982 Reliab + IN no
Frye-narrow,
IN SC Cornett 450 N.E.2d 498 1983 Frye-broad OUT no
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Jurisdic- Court Case Cite Date Legal Test* Held NAS
tion Report
OH SC Williams 446 N.E.2d 444 1983 Reliability IN no
AZ SC Gortarez 686 P.2d 1224 1984 Frye-broad OUT yes
RI SC Wheeler 496 A.2d 1382 1985 McC IN no
LA APP Free 493 So.2d 781 1986 Relevancy OUT slightly
balance
NJ SC Wind- 522 A.2d 405 1987 Frye-broad OUT no
mere
CO SC Drake 748 P.2d 1237 1988 Frye-broad OUT no
US-7 Cir. APP Smith 869 F.2d 348 1989 Reliability + IN slightly[Frye]
US-Di TR Maivia 728 F. Supp. 1471 1990 Reliab + IN slightly
Frye-narrow
US-6 Cr. APP Leon 966 F.2d 1455 (Ta- 1992 McC IN no
ble) -L
The legal tests are abbreviated as follows: Frye with the relevant
fields defined broadly (Frye-broad), or narrowly (Frye-narrow), reli-
ability (reliab) or relevancy (relev), or McCormick weighting (McC).
The court levels are: court of last resort (sc), court of appeals
(ca), trial (tr). Brackets indicate a test a court stated it was applying
but where there is no indication in the opinion that the court actually
applied that test.
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